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The author presents a methodology for evaluating the
seismic vulnerability of a bases facilities. The method-
ology starts with the determination of the "mission impor-
tant" facilities to a base, the foundation of which is the
importance of the missions they house. The results of which
are used to determine the facilities that should be studied
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Divisions. The methodology presents alternatives for evalu-
ating the results of the engineering and seismic studies,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Department of the Navy has numerous bases in active
seismic regions of the world. The missions of the Navy are
such that basing in these areas of active or potentially
active seismic regions is unavoidable.
Each base resembles a small city, containing major
industrial and residential areas. The replacement value of
the structures alone is estimated in excess of $25 billion.
The Navy has a military construction budget of about $200
million for new structures in these seismically hazardous
regions. Adding the investment in equipment and people the
potential loss in dollar terms from seismic activity is
tremendous. Added to this and of more significance is the
loss of mission capabilities. The realization that
buildings or facilities exist only to support a base's
mission is important to the concept of this thesis.
[Ref. 1: p. 1]
The Navy is investing in engineering and seismic studies
to evaluate the vulnerability of the shore establishment to
seismic damage. The evaluation of the findings of these
engineering and seismic studies is left up to the individual
base studied. This thesis presents a methodology for the
base to use in directing and evaluating the findings of the
engineering and seismic studies. Such a base evaluation is
titled a Seismic Risk Mitigation Study.
Directing the engineering and seismic studies is an
important portion of a Seismic Risk Mitigation Study. With
an evaluation of the bases facilities for mission
importance, the engineering studies to evaluate the
potential for seismic damage can be directed to the
facilities that are most important to the performance of a
base's mission. With such directic ., funds would not be
spent evaluating facilities that provide little to the
accomplishment of a base's mission.
The research question posed and answered by this thesis
is: How should the results of the engineering and seismic
studies best be evaluated at the base level?
The outline of the basic methodology presented in this
thesis is contained in Figure 1.1. A Seismic Risk
Mitigation Study starts with a realization that the
potential for loss of mission capabilities from seismic
hazards exist. A study is ordered and a study group formed
to conduct the Seismic Risk Mitigation Study. The first
phase of the study is determining the missions of the base
and determining what facilities are required to perform the
missions. From the evaluation of the missions a base's
facilities are classified into one of five categories,
called facility types. The base commander approves the
classifications of the facilities. The next step involves
directing and examining the engineering and seismic
vulnerability studies. Directing the engineering
vulnerability studies concerns using the facility type
classifications to det- ±ne which facilities should be
investigated. The engi ering and seismic vulnerability
studies and other information are examined to determine the
replacement cost, seismic risk reduction cost and the
probable damage estimates for each facility. Finally, these
costs are used to determine a rank ordering of the
facilities within each category. The rank ordering
indicates which seismic risk reduction projects would have
the highest return per dollar spent on a project to upgrade
the facility. The result of the Seismic Risk Mitigation
Study is this rank ordered listing of upgrading projects.
With the results of the study the base can most effectively
invest funds to reduce the identified seismic hazards. Two
10
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Phase: Obtain Approval of Facilities Tupe List
Input : Facilities Type List and Justification
Output: Commanding Officer's Approval of
Facility Type List
Phase: Evaluate Engineering Studies for FaciHtu Damage
Inputs: Facility Type List









Inputs : Cost to Upgrade Facilities
Probabilities of Exceedence
Output : Rank Ordering of Upgrading Projects
Figure 1.1 Seismic Risk Mitigation Study Steps
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important by-products of the conduct of a Seismic Risk
Mitigation Study are inputs for an Emergency Facilities Use
Plan and a Seismic Damage Potential Map. Both of these
by-products are explained in appendices
.
This study is based on participation in a test Seismic
Vulnerability Study at the Naval Air Station (NAS), Moffett
Field, California by the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory
(NCEL) , Port Hueneme, California and a review of the
pertinent literature.
The methodology for the conduct of a Seismic Risk
Mitigation Study as presented herein has not been applied in
any test case. The Moffett Field test study has not
progressed past the translation of missions to facilities
phase. The survey results are presented in NCEL Technical
Memorandum TM-51-84-09 [Ref. 1] . The determination of the
mission essential facilities as determined during the
Moffett Field test study will be presented in NCEL Technical
Memorandum TM- 45 6 6 [Ref. 2].
The methodology represents a reasonable effort to best
use the information provided by the engineering and seismic
studies. The actual conduct of a Seismic Risk Mitigation
Study is not intended to be performed by engineers or
seismologists, but by base personnel knowledgeable about the
base and its missions. Certain processes may require an
engineering evaluation. Where required, suggestions for
obtaining these evaluations are presented.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. NATURE OF THE EARTHQUAKE THREAT
The threat of damage and loss of life due to earthquakes
and related phenomena is great. Many areas of the world are
known for their high seismic activity. Japan is said to
have a measurable earthquake every day. The San Andreas
Fault is famous as a highly active earth fault. The general
threat of damage from earthquakes and specific applications
to Naval installations are shown in Table I It is important
for the reader to understand the widespread devastation
which could occur from an earthquake. Because the
Continental United States has not experienced a recent
devastating earthquake, the following paragraphs will
summarize the types of possible damage.
The most damaging manifestation of the earthquake threat
is the actual ground shaking or movement causing the
collapse of buildings with a loss of life of those trapped
in or under the wreckage. Structural damage from ground
shaking can range from merely cracked plaster to total
collapse. Ground shaking provisions have been incorporated
into design codes and construction techniques to reduce the
damage potential. They do so by providing required strength
and ductility to absorb the energy transmitted to the site
in the form of ground vibration.
Ground shaking, even with good seismic structural
design, can cause nonstructural damage. This is damage
caused by and to the furnishings of a building, or its
mechanical and electrical systems. A file cabinet, computer
or inventory overturning due to an earthquake are all
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1. Chemical or Hazardous Material Spills,
Tank Rupture
designed buildings, nonstructural damage can cause the
interruption of operations being performed in a building.
This is an important concept in the study that follows.
Ground movement can also cause surface faulting, rifts
or lateral displacement. Faulting or rifts are separations
or cracks in the ground causes by soil settlement, sliding
or other causes. Lateral displacement is the movement along
a fault, resulting in offsets to roads, streams or
structures that bisect a fault; photographs show the offset
caused by the movement along the fault. During the 1906 San
Francisco Earthquake (Richter magnitude 8.0) the horizontal
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displacement along the fault was up to 21 feet. Roads,
runways or utilities bisecting a fault could be sheared if
displacement occures. [Ref. 3: p. 12]
Specific threats from ground shaking and displacement to
Naval installations are similar to seismic hazards faced in
other active areas. The age of the building has much to do
with the designed seismic resistance. Many Navy buildings
were designed and built without the benefits of the current
knowledge of structural performance. The age and
construction quality of the buildings are factors in the
current seismic resistance. The nonstructural hazards of
the contents are present primarily from the lack of bracing
or anchorage of nonstructural items.
Seismic activity can lead to high ground pore water
pressure and ground settlement, technically known as soil
liquefication. Soil liquefication is in essence, a
quicksand like condition which under shaking can lead to
soil settlement or lateral sliding of massive portions of
ground. Soil liquefication is most probable in waterfront
areas with high water tables where the soil composition is
loose sands or fill material. Unfortunately, this is the
condition that exists at most Naval waterfront
installations. Soil liquefication can cause damage to
piers, quay walls, buildings, drydocks, utilities systems,
roads and runways. Differential settlement is also
possible, primarily from variation in the underlying
sediments
.
Land and mud slides are well known problems in parts of
California. They can occur by seismic causes or nonseismic
causes such as ground water fluctuation. Areas that are
prone to sliding generally are identifiable, but methods to
reduce the threat may not be easily accomplished. In areas
of generally unstable soil, such as California, the
traditional methods of slope reinforcement have had limited
15
success. Seismically induced sliding most likely would
challenge ordinary slope reinforcement efforts. The best
method to reduce the hazards from sliding is not to build on
or in a slide prone area. Mapping of the potential slide
and affected areas can reduce the hazard by not having
people or facilities in the hazardous area. Sliding can
also occur underwater, submarine sliding can create problems
for ships by reducing the channels to the point the channels
do not provide the necessary depth for ships to pass.
Tsunamis are seismically induced high amplitude sea
waves. Tsunamis are a unique indirect product of
earthquakes in that the causative event may be hundreds of
miles away from the damaging effect of the Tsunami striking
a coastal area. The Great Alaskan Earthquake of 1964-
(Richter magnitude 8.3) produced a tsunami that caused 119
deaths in Crescent City, California. The wave that caused
the damage was estimated at nine feet. For waterfront
structures and Naval installations tsunamis are especially
worrisome because of the damage potential they have.
Tsunamis have three areas of potential damage, first is the
overtopping of dikes or retaining walls causing flooding or
damage to structures. Next is the affect of the wave "draw
down" and "run up" on ships, piers and waterfront
structures. A tsunami wave has a "draw down" or lowering of
the water level equal to the "run up" or height of the wave.
These differences in water level can cause damage to ships
by their striking bottom, piers by the strain of the moored
ships first downward and then upward. There would not be
time to adjust the mooring lines between the "draw down" and
the "run up". Waterfront structures, such as quay walls,
are susceptible to collapse as their design is dependent on
the hydrostatic pressure of the water. Without the water
pressure during the "draw down" the possibility of collapse
on old or poorly designed waterfront structures is great.
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The final area of damage from tsunamis is in the unusual or
extrastrong currents caused by the influx of the extra water
in the waves. These currents can cause damage to waterfront
structures. [Ref. 4]
Seismically induced failures of dams or levees can cause
significant loss of life or property damage. The cause of
the failure may be any of the reasons mentioned above but
the potential damage can be much more severe simply due to
the inundation by water such as would be expected by a dam
failure.
The fire hazards are often overlooked when evaluating
earthquake hazards. More property was lost from fires
following the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake than by the
direct shaking of the earth [Ref. 5: p. 109]. The threat
today is somewhat reduced by the use of improved
construction materials and construction practices but the
potential for damage is still great. The shaking may also
cause interior wiring to break exposing wires that can short
and cause a fire. Exterior electric distribution networks
may fail and cause shorting, fuel storage or fuel
distribution networks may rupture due to the ground shaking
providing the fuel for the fire. Ground shaking may cause
breaks in the water distribution system, reducing the fire
fighting capability. The possibilities for fire exist,
without a ready source of water the fire fighting efforts
are hindered, thereby leading to an unacceptable level of
damage due to fire. Methods to decrease the hazards from
fire are the seismic strengthing of the water distribution
system, and the utilities and fuel systems.
Finally, there are hazards associated with the storage
and handling of chemicals or hazardous materials.
Seismically caused overturning of chemical or hazardous
containers can lead to a hazardous vapor cloud. The first
indication of a problem may be the death of a person
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involved in the recov r effort. Methods to reduce this
hazard include separa .on of the storage of chemicals so
accide cal spilling will not create a hazardous mixture, and
restraints on storage bins or cabinets.
The severity to which the hazards exist depends on the
magnitude and proximity of the earthquake. The closer to
the epicenter or the greater or longer the shaking the more
damage can be expected. The extent of the earthquake threat
to a specific area is found through the use of Seismic Risk
Maps .
B. SEISMIC RISK MAPS
Figure 2.1 is the Department of Defense Seismic Zone Map
of the United States [Ref. 6: p. 3-13]. Seismic Zone or Risk
Maps are derived from historical occurances of earthquakes,
but do not consider local physical conditions or earthquake
return times. The maps present a rough idea of the long
term earthquake hazard for an area. No common time scale is
implied. A major earthquake would not be expected to occur
as frequently in an East Coast Zone 3 as in a West Coast
Zone 3. The Department of Defense Seismic Zone Map has five
zones (0 to 4). The difference in the number and general
delineation of the seismic zones is necessary for the
designing the lateral resistance of a building and is used
in the assigning of a facility construction design
coefficient, or safety factor, as prescribed by Reference 6.
The intent is to generally identify the seismic potential
for the areas of the world. The greater the zone number the
greater the history for damage in that area and the greater
the need for more structural resistance in buildings. For
each zone there is a approximate level of shaking which
might be expected during the life of a facility. These
levels can be described by the Modified Mercalli Scale of
18
Figure 2.1 Seismic Zone Map.
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Earthquake Intensity. The correlation is shown in Table II
with Table III provi lg a description of the Modified
Mercalli scale. [Ref. : p. 11]
TABLE II
Seismic Zone to Me rcalli Intensity Correlation




3 and 4 - VIII and Greater
The expected future seismic activity for a specific site
can be found through an evaluation of the historical
occurances of earthquakes in the region containing the site
and an evaluation of the available geologic data for the
site. An automated computer program for performing seismic
analyses of these types is contained in NCEL Technical
Report R-885 [Ref. 8]
.
Earthquakes can be measured in terms of intensity
(damage effects at a given distance from the source) and
magnitude (a release of a given energy amount). The
intensity of an earthquake is measured using the Modified
Mercalli Scale (Table III). The measurement is in terms of
earthquake effects, and is either descriptive or
quantitative. Intensities are measured based on the human
senses and are used to describe the effects of the
earthquake in different areas near the epicenter. Plotting
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TABLE III
Modified Mercalli Scale of Earthquake Intensity
I Not Felt
II Felt by persons at rest, on upper floors, or favorably placed.
III Felt indoors. Hanging objects swing. Vibrations like passing
of light truck.
IV Hanging objects swing. Vibrations like passing of heavy trucks;
or sensation of a jolt. Standing automobiles rock. Windows, dishes,
doors rattle. Glasses clink. Wooden walls and frames may creek.
V Felt outdoors; direction estimated. Sleepers awakened. Liguids
disturbed, some spilled. Small unstable objects displaced or upset.
Doors, shutters, pictures moved.
VI Felt by all. Persons walk unsteady. Windows, dishes, glassware
broken. Knicknacks, books, etc. fall off shelves; pictures off walls.
Furniture moved or overturned. Weak plaster and average-quality
masonry cracks. Small bells ring (churches, school) . Trees, bushes
shake.
|
VII Difficult to stand. Noticed by drivers of automobiles. Hanging
objects quiver. Furniture broken. Damage to weak masonry. Weak
chimneys broken at roof line. Fall of plaster, loose bricks, stones,
tile, cornices, etc. Waves on ponds; water turbid with mud. Small
slides and caving-in along sand or gravel banks. Large bells ring.
Concrete irrigation ditches damaged.
VIII Steering of automobiles affected. Damage to average masonry;
partial collapse. Some damage to good, partially reinforced masonry;
none to good, fully reinforced masonry. Fall of stucco and some
masonry walls. Twisting, fall of chimneys, factory stacks, monuments,
towers, elevated tanks. Frame houses moved on foundation if not
bolted down; loose panel walls thrown out. Branches broken from
trees. Changes in flow or temperature of springs or wells. Cracks in
wet ground and steep slopes.
IX General panic. Weak masonry destroyed; average masonry heavily
damaged, some with complete collapse; good, partly reinforced masonry
seriously damaged. Frame structures, if not bolted, shifted off
foundations. Serious damage to reservoirs. Onderground pipes broken.
Conspicuous cracks in ground. In alluviated areas sand and mud
ejected, earthquake fountains, sand craters.
X Most masonry and frame structures destroyed with their
foundations. Some well-built wooden structures and bridges destroyed.
Serious damage to dams, dikes, embankments. Large landslides. Water
thrown onto banks of canals, rivers, lakes, etc. Sand and mud shifted
horizontally on beaches and flat land. Rails bent slightly.
XI Rails bent greatly. Underground pipelines completely out of
service.
XII Damage nearly total. Large rock masses displaced. Lines of
sight and level distorted. Objects thrown into the air.
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of the intensities are done using isoseismal lines on an
isoseismal map. [Ref. 9: p. 43]
Magnitude is a computed rating obtained from
interpretations of seismograph readings. The inventor of
the magnitude scale, Charles Richter defines the scale as
follows
:
"Magnitude is intended to be a rating of a given
earthquake independent of the place of
observation. Since it is calculated from
measurements on seismograms , it is properly
expressed in ordinary numbers and decimals.
Magnitude was originally defined as the logarithm
of the maximum amplitude on a seismogram written
by an instrument of specified standard type at a
distance of 100 kilometers (62 miles) from the
epicenter .. .Bee lse the scale is logarithmic,
every upward step of one magnitude means
multiplying th recorded amplitude by 10 . . . The
largest known e.rthquake magnitudes are near 8.75;
this is a result of observation, not an arbitrary
'ceiling' like that of the intensity scales. '
[Ref. 3:p. 70]
C. FEDERAL EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS REDUCTION
The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (Public Law
95-124) has as its purpose the reduction of the risks to
life and property from earthquakes through the establishment
and maintenance of an effective earthquake hazards reduction
program.
The general issues Congress outlined in implementing the
program to reduce earthquake hazards are:
1. Preparedness and response planning.
2. Earthquake prediction and warning.
3. Earthquake hazards reduction through construction
programs
.
4. The role of private and public financial
institutions
.
5. Land-use planning and its implementation.
6. Communication and education.
[Ref. 10: p. 19]
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Preparedness and response planning is concerned with
evaluating the pre- earthquake (or disaster) recovery
planning efforts of federal, state and local governments and
the post-earthquake hazards reduction and recovery planning.
Thirty-nine States are wholly or partially located in areas
of high or moderate seismic risk. The potential for loss of
life, destruction of property and economic disruption caused
by earthquakes is significant. Preparedness and response
planning at all levels of government can reduce the impacts
of earthquakes. The intent of the planning and response
planning issue is to encourage the preparedness of
governments, to coordinate the efforts of the various levels
of governments, and to ensure the reduction of the loss of
life and property by effective recovery efforts.
Earthquake prediction and warning issue is concerned
with developing an effective method to predict earthquakes,
warn the population at risk and address the social and
economic aspects of such a warning. Some scientific effort
is being expended to develop a method for predicting
earthquakes. The reduction of earthquake hazards to human
life is possible with evacuation from the predicted affected
area. A few hours warning can significantly reduce the loss
to human life with an effective evacuation policy. Notice
of months or years can significantly reduce the hazards to
buildings by allowing time to strengthen the building.
Prediction currently is not an exact science and even when
it does become exact the problems with the prediction itself
need to be examined. If an area is predicted to have a
major earthquake in a year, the economic aspects of
businesses leaving, etc. may cause untold economic panic.
Homeowners would try to sell property or gain earthquake
insurance. Insurance companies would not issue policies or
charge uneconomical rates. The impacts of predicting an
earthquake on the community are a major concern in the study
of this issue.
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Earthquake hazards reduction through construction
programs is probably one of the easiest to define and
implement. Building codes for new construction can, and in
certain areas have, been designed to provide a building that
provides seismic resistance. The basis of the building
codes for the State of California and the Department of
Defense is influenced by seismic potential levels. New
construction can protect against the loss of life by
implementation of semisically current state of the art
design provisions in building codes. Upgrading existing
buildings to reduce seismically induced hazards is
conceptually simple, evaluate the building and rebuild to
reduce hazards by providing increased seismic resistance.
The problem with upgrading existing buildings is with the
costs of evaluation and rebuilding. Again, action by
government could force hazards reduction through mandatory
upgrading of existing buildings.
The role of private and public financial institutions in
reducing earthquake hazards is not easy to define. The
impacts on financial institutions of a damaging earthquake
are potentially fatal. If a bank has many mortgages in an
area destroyed by an earthquake the collateral for those
loans is potentially worthless. Earthquake insurance claims
after an earthquake could bankrupt a insurer. With the
advent of earthquake prediction the defaulting on loans by
businesses leaving the area or homeowners is a great
possibility. These and other impacts on the financial
institutions are the basis of study in this area.
Land-use planning and implementation is another
conceptually easy hazard reduction issue. Restricting the
building near active faults, on unstable soils, or in
generally seismically unsafe areas can reduce the hazards
that otherwise could be present . It would seem that only a
fool would build on or near an active or known earthquake
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fault, but it happens. Daly City, California sits astride
the famous San Andreas Fault. In fact a housing development
was built astride the fault in Daly City in the 1960's.
Identification of seismically hazardous areas is continuing,
governments actions to restrict the use of these areas are
the concepts under study.
Communication and education is simply providing
information to the population on the hazards from
earthquakes. General and specific information is required
and needs to be presented in such a way as not to create a
doomsday attitude. Seismologists predict a major earthquake
will occur in the San Francisco area every 100 years. As
the last major earthquake was in 1906, the probability of
the next major earthquake becomes greater as time
progresses. [Refs. 7,10: pp. 14, 20-67]
Congress has recognized the need to reduce the potential
hazards from earthquakes, and has provided funds, to study
the issues outlined above. The efforts of the Department of
the Navy will be examined next.
D. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY EARTHQUAKE RELATED PROGRAMS
The Navy has a significant earthquake problem. The
worldwide basing of the Navy has required the location of
naval bases in seismically active or risky areas. The
investment in structures at the shore activities in these
areas is estimated to be $25 billion. [Ref. 1: p. 1]
While the Department of the Navy has no formal
earthquake programs, several programs are earthquake safety
related. These programs include: expedient measures to
reduce earthquake hazards; dam inspections; drydock
inspections; seismically influenced building designs;
facilities inspections; and research and development.
25
The expedient measures to reduce earthquake haz .rds were
directed by Naval Facilities Engineering Command Instruction
11012.141 [Ref. 11]. This instruction recommended actions
to be taken to reduce earthquake hazards. The actions are
largely quick fix methods to secure nonstructural
components, utilities or equipment. The methods are
generally inexpensive fixes designed to prevent seismically
induced failure of the components. Typical fixes include
anchoring transformers to prevent their overturning or
laterally restraining non-load bearing partitions.
A portion of the dam inspection programs is concerned
with evaluating the possibility of seismically induced
failure of Navy and Marine Corps owned dams in seismic zones
3 and 4. Upgrading projects are required whenever seismic
deficiencies are found. [Ref. 12]
The drydock inspection and certification program is
similar in nature, a great investment in facilities, mission
capabilities and ships could be lost in the event of
seismically induced failure. This program required
inspection of all drydocks and the development of upgrading
projects where deficiencies were found. Seismic resistance
considerations were an important part of this inspection
program. [Ref. 13]
The seismically influenced building design program was
the issuance in 1974 of a standard criteria, or design code,
for seismic design for all Department of Defense structures.
The basis of this criteria was the criteria published by the
Structural Engineers Association of California. The same
criteria is the basis for the building and design codes of
the State of California. Since 1974 all DOD structures
worldwide have been designed using this same seismic
criteria. Adjustments for the building location and
intended use are made through the use of design factors.
The seismic risk zone maps provide one design factor,
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providing a stronger seismically resistant building in zone
4 than in zone 0. Another design factor is influenced by
the intended building use. A distinction is made between
essential facilities, high risk facilities and all other
facilities. Table IV is an explanation of the distinction
between the facility types. The distinction between
facility types is necessary to provide another design
factor. This design factor provides a stronger building for
an essential facility than for a high risk facility.
The design criteria is intended to design structures
that will:
1. Resist minor earthquakes without damage.
2. Resist moderate earthquakes without structural
damage, but with some nonstructural damage.
3. Resist major earthquakes, of the intensity of
severity of the strongest experienced in California,
without collapse, but with some structural as well as
nonstructural damage.
[Ref. 6: p. 2-4]
The facilities inspection program was developed to
evaluate the seismic resistance in existing Naval
facilities. Reference 14 required a seismic investigation
be conducted in conjunction with any construction project to
modernize, rehabilitate or provide major repairs where the
cost of the project is $100,000 or 10% of the replacement
cost of the structure. The purpose of the seismic study was
to evaluate the structure for possible seismically caused
life safety hazards which then would be included in the
project for elimination. Reference 15 recommended base wide
seismic safety studies but provided no funding to accomplish
them. In 1977 the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
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to assess the seismic vulnerability of entire Naval bases.
These studies are administered through the Engineering Field
Divisions and are to be conducted at all Naval installations
in DOD seismic zones 3 and 4. These base wide studies are
called Phase I studies and are to be performed at 92 Naval
Bases worldwide. Table V is a listing of the bases or
geographic areas where the Phase I studies are to be
performed, by Engineering Field Division. [Ref. 16]
About 70% of the Phase I studies are completed at this
time [Ref. 1: p. 1] . The Phase I study provides findings on
the facilities studied, and geotechnical and seismic hazards
of the base. The facilities findings are based on a rapid
analysis technique developed by the Naval Civil Engineering
Laboratory [Ref. 17]. The facility findings indicate
anticipated structural responses under differing seismic
loadings. Appendix B contains a sample facilities report.
The geotechnical and seismic hazards section of a Phase I
study present findings on the geological, seismicity and
ground motion evaluations of the base. Specific hazards
associated due to ground displacement, soil liquef ication,
tsunamis, etc. are addressed in this section. basic
information to the base on the anticipated structural
response and possible damage to the facilities studied.
The Phase I studies did not evaluate every facility on
the base. The criteria for evaluation under a Phase I study
are that it be:
1. Built prior to 1974. (The assumption is that all
facilities built after 1974 were built using the new
design criteria.)
2. Be over 3,000 square feet in floor space.
3. Have a replacement cost of over $100,000.
4. Be able to be rapidly analyzed. (The engineering
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5. Be selected for evaluation based on occupancy or
mission importance, as determined by base personnel.
The determination of what facilities should be
evaluated should be based on the importance of the
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facility to the base. The methodology presented
herein aids in making these facility importance
determinations
.
The structures analyzed under the Phase I studies were
to be evaluated under three possible earthquake conditions,
a 50 year, 100 year and 225 year return time earthquakes.
While the Phase I studies used specific Peak Ground
Acceleration (PGA) "g" (gravity) forces in their
calculations based on the base location, etc. the return
times correspond to the PGA "g" forces that can be expected
in earthquakes of these return times. [Ref. 17] The
expected PGA "g" forces were determined using automated
techniques such as that described by NCEL Technical Report
R-885 [Ref. 8]. These automated techniques use information
on the geological and known seismic hazards near the base to
estimate the PGA's expected. Simply stated a return time of
50 years is an earthquake of such a magnitude that it will
only happen once in 50 years. By this simple definition a
225 year earthquake will be much more severe than a 50 year
earthquake, as a 225 year earthquake will occur only once in
225 years. For example, the estimated Richter value for
earthquakes along the San Andreas Fault in the San Francisco
area are estimated at:
50 year return time 7.0
100 year return time 8.0
225 year return time 8.3
[Ref. 18]
Facilities which the Phase I study indicates anticipated
damage of over 30% are to be evaluated under a follow on
engineering study called Phase II studies. Phase II studies
consist of a detailed engineering evaluation to predict the
actual extent of seismically induced damage. The Phase II
study will also provide a plan and cost estimate to
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structurally upgrade the facility and a cost estimate to
reduce nonstructural hazards. Appendix B contains Phase
and II facility reports. [Refs. 19,20]
The research and development programs include projects
under study by NCEL and recommendations of the Navy
Earthquake Risk Reduction Panel. The NCEL projects include
the development of the Rapid Analysis Technique used for the
Phase I studies and other projects. The Navy Earthquake
Risk Reduction Panel was commissioned by the Office of Naval
Research in 1984 to conduct an overview of the earthquake
programs run by the Navy and makes recommendations on the
future areas of effort. The panel is comprised of
seismologists, geologists and engineers from academia, Navy
commands and the U.S. Geological Survey.
One of the recommendations of the panel was that the
Phase II studies be assigned on the basis of the mission
importance of the facility or system [Ref. 21]. The current
criteria for selection of facilities to be evaluated by the
Phase II studies is up to the discretion of the Engineering
Field Division administering the contract. In some cases
the Phase II studies evaluated World War II era temporary
structures. The study methodology presented in this thesis
is to determine the most important facilities to a base, in
part a response to the panels recommendation.
The process of performing a Seismic Risk Mitigation
Study will identify the facilities that are most important
to the performance of the base's missions. Using this
information the Phase II studies can be directed to include
the most important facilities. Such direction will ensure
the funds spent on the Phase II studies will return the most
benefit to the base.
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E. DEFINITIONS
In the procedures that follow, several terms or concepts




A facility is a structure or system. Buildings,
roads, runways, electrical distribution systems, telephone
systems, etc. are all examples of a facility for purposes of
this study. A facility can be comprised of one building or
be comprised of a series of buildings, tanks, lines, etc.
At times a system will be described as a complete facility,
but where ever possible the system should be broken into
uniquely identifiable portions. For example, if the fuel
system is described as being "Mission Essential", the system
should be evaluated to determine exactly what portions are
most important to the performance of the mission and which
portions are secondary to the mission. The most important




The output of the study is a listing of base
facilities by descriptive terms as "Mission Essential", etc.
The term "Mission Essential" is used to highlight the
relative importance of the facilities so designated. The
importance of the facility is in terms of the missions being
performed therein. The intent is not to downgrade the
facilities not labeled as "Mission Essential". Throughout
the study a numbering system tied to a facility function
description is used to avoid the inherent bias of the term
"Mission Essential". The term "Mission Essential" is only
applied when the facility lists are presented to the
Commanding Officer or study authorizing officer, to
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highlight the importance of these facilities over the others




The base is the Naval installation under study. The
physical definition of the base can be complicated by the
presence of other Naval activities in the area. The
definition of the base in San Diego could be the entire
Naval complex- Submarine Base, North Island, Coronado,
Miramar, etc. or each of these installations. The
definition of the installation to be studies is made by the
authority directing the study. If the Commanding Of. cer of
NAS , North Island orders the study the base is North Island.
The missions of the NAS and all the tenant commands located
on North Island are included in the study.
4. The Study Group
The study group is the collection of persons who
will be responsible to the base commander or the study
authorizing officer for the administering of the Seismic
Risk Mitigation Study as defined herein. The makeup of the
study group is of importance, since the decisions t. will
have to make may affect the ability of the base to f ction
after an earthquake. The study group will require
information on the possible missions of the base and its
tenant commands. It needs authority to distribute
questionnaires, to contact individual department heads and
tenant commands concerning their missions and facilities.
They will need access to Public Works records on building
construction and modifications, the Phase I and II studies
if completed, and other information such as base master
plans, etc. A good deal of the information that is needed
by the study gr up is within the domain of the Public Works
Depai cment or Center so the inclusion of an engineer either
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civilian or military is required. The inclusion of a person
with access and specific knowledge of the operations and
missions of the base and its tenant commands is recommended.
The study group should not be overly large with a
representative of every department and tenant command, but a
small group of about four that can meet and work to perform
this study. As will be seen the study will require a good
deal of time and effort on the part of the study group. The
forming of a committee to perform this study would only
delay the completion and possibly erode the desired results
by the inclusion of self-interests.
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III. DETERMINATION OF MISSION ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
The determination of mission essential facilities must
start with the missions of the base. A facility is not
important unless a mission essential function must be
performed in it. Keeping this facet in mind the basic steps
in determining which facilities are mission essential are:
1. Determine the missions and mission elements of the
base.
2. Translate the mission functions to facilities.
3. Determine the "uniqueness" of the facility.
4. Determine subordinate facilities to the essential
facilities
.
5. Obtain approval of the essential facilities listing.
The Seismic Risk Mitigation Study (hereafter refered to
as the study) will require the involvement of many people
beyond the study group. The basic translation of missions
into facilities is performed using a survey distributed to
department heads/tenant commands. The involvement of these
people in the survey process and later discussions is a key
to the success of the study.
A. DETERMINE THE MISSION FUNCTIONS OF THE BASE
Every Naval activity is assigned general and specific
missions by their chain of command. The assigning of the
mission can be in the form of instructions, contingency
plans or other documents. In determining the mission
functions of a base the study group must consider the
activities performed by the base and all its tenant commands
under the three possible mission scenarios: peacetime,
contingency or wartime and disaster recovery operations.
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Each of these scenarios are examined to ensure that an
otherwise unimportant facility is not overlooked. An
example might be a gymnasium that is used for emergency
shelter during disaster recovery operations. The documents
that identify the mission functions under the possible
scenarios need to be researched by the study group. This is
to ensure that all mission functions of the base/tenant
commands are considered during the determination of mission
essential facilities process.
B. TRANSLATE THE MISSION FUNCTIONS TO FACILITIES
Translating the mission functions into facilities is a
procedure that should be done by the commands involved at
the department head/tenant command level. The procedure for
the translation of mission functions to facilities is a four
part questionnaire/survey developed by NCEL and modified by
the author. The questionnaire is designed to be filled out
by the department head/ tenant command as that officer will
be the most knowledgeable of the information requested by
the survey. [Ref. 1]
1. Questionnaire Procedures
The procedure for filling out the questionnaire and
for performing this translation are described below.
Survey forms and instructions along with a sample completed
survey are contained in Appendix A.
Also contained in the questionnaire procedures are
insights as to the reasons for the questions and the
intended results of the questions.
a. Part 1A: Mission Statements
Instructions for Part 1A: Briefly write the
general mission statement of the unit/department.
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Additionally, include any special mission requirements not
included in the general mission statement for peacetime,
contingency or disaster recovery missions.
The intent of part one is to identify the
mission functions performed by the unit /department /division
being investigated.
b. Part IB: Tactical/Strategic Mission Elements
Instructions for Part IB: From the general and
specific mission statements shown in part 1A, extract those
elements that are of tactical/strategic significance.
Include those elements that have direct significance to the
military mission. Indicate in which readiness/alert
condition the military element is performed. Do not include
mission elements that are not of strategic or tactical
military significance.
The readiness/alert conditions requirements are
established in OPNAV Instruction C3500.29 series. The
intent in Part IB is for the user to differentiate between
what is most important in their specific mission functions.
The use of the readiness conditions gives the study group an
indication of the user's importance of the function between
peacetime and contingency operations.
c. Part 2: Functional Breakdown of Mission Elements
Instructions for Part 2: For each
strategic/ tactical element shown in Part IB, provide a
detailed breakdown of all tasks or functions that must be
accomplished to perform the mission element. Be specific.
Include all support service provided to your unit /department
upon which you are dependent to accomplish the mission
element even if it is not under your control. Show the
element number from Part IB in the space provided.
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The intent here is to translate specific mission
elements that may be written in unique acronyms into more
general language. The study group will, most likely, not be
familiar with all the acronyms used in the mission
statements, Part 2 translates the general mission functions
into more manageable pieces.
d. Part 3: Further Functional Breakdown of Mission
Elements
Instructions for Part 3: For each of the
functions or actions listed in Part 2, show all facilities
and utilities required to accomplish the function. Include
all support facilities and utilities even if they are not
under your control. Note the functions shown are only those
required to support strategic/ tactical mission elements of
direct military significance. Include all special
requirements, such as electrical power, telephones,
mechanical air conditioning for equipment, etc. Show the
current building number or other identification where the
function is performed.
In Part 3 the unit/department has evaluated
their mission functions and translated them into specific
facilities and utilities.
e. Part 4: List of Facilities Presently Occupied
Instructions for Part 4: List all
buildings/facilities in which your unit/department occupies
space and performs functions that are of strategic or
tactical military significance. Include all direct support
facilities over which you have control. Do not include
buildings that are not of military significance. Show the
function performed in the building. Indicate special
requirements, such as backup electrical power. Indicate
your opinion of the facility type as described below.
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Indicate if the function can be relocated in an emergency,
if so to where. Give a building number or description.
Indicate if a back-up for this function exists on base, in
the local area, on other federal installations in the area,
if so where. Give an estimate of how long this function
could be interrupted in an emergency, without impairing the
mission function.
Part 4 is in part a reiteration of Part 3 but
with much more information. The special requirements and
information on the extent to which the facility could be
relocated or interrupted or if the facility is duplicated
are all required in the evaluation of the facility for
"uniqueness". The facilities type used in Part 4 is an
indication of the uniqueness of the facility, it is another
indicator to the study group of the user's perception of how
important his particular facilities are.
Descriptions of the facilities types are:
FACILITY TYPE
1 Critical structure containing materials that, if
released into the atmosphere, could cause a
catastrophe
.
2 Facilities directly supporting the military
strategic/ tactical missions that must remain
functional after an earthquake without significant
interruption to prevent serious degradation of the
military mission. Examples include: mission
essential and primary communication or
data-handling facilities, facilities involved in
missile control, launch, tracking or other
critical defense capabilities.
3 Facilities directly supporting the military
strategic/ tactical mission that can substain minor
damage resulting in some limited period of
inoperability but are repairable and can be
returned to service. Also included are indirect
support services supporting medical treatment,
food preparation, fire fighting, utilities. Type
3 facilities generally house functions that are
not relocatable and for which backup sources are
not available.
4 Facilities important to indirect support
facilities that are significant to maintaining
direct support operations. Direct support
facilities that have backup or are relocatable.
5 Indirect support facilities (shops, repair
40
facilities, storage facilities) that can tolerate
disruption or can be relocated to other facilities
or easily reconstituted.
From the initial survey the study group develops
an initial listing of facilities by facility type. This
listings is the first cut of the mission essential
facilities. The study group must not take the facility type
determination of the users as final, as this is the users
opinion and the user has an inherent interest in the
self-importance of his mission functions. Also the
instructions may not have been understood. The listing
derived from the questionnaires is a begining that is most
useful to the study group.
2 . Determine the "Uniqueness " of the Facility
From the completed surveys, the study group will
have a listing of facilities that are currently being used
to satisfy the missions of the base and its tenant commands.
This section uses the information provided in Parts 3 and 4
of the survey along with additional information to determine
the "uniqueness" of the facility. This section and the next
section on determining subordinate functions are the most
important in the determination of important facilities, are
conducted concurrently and are revised and updated as
information is gathered.
Uniqueness is comprised of three elements: the
extent to which the facility can be: relocated, interrupted,
and is duplicated. (relocatability , interruptability and
duplication)
Relocatability is the ease of relocating the
function to another location in the area, on or off base.
Most any administrative function can be easily relocated
where as a function requiring specialized, temperature
controlled equipment can not. The easier the function is to
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be relocated and returned to operation after an earthquake
the less unique the structure housing the mission function
is. For example: the base commander is considered an
important function, however if his office is destroyed he
can easily relocate to any undamaged space that meets his
needs of power, telephone, etc. This step is designed to
highlight those mission functions that are generally limited
to the facility where they are currently located. An
example of a non- relocatable function is a communications
center. The specialized equipment has certain power,
temperature control and cabling requirements that are t
generally r seated base. The easier the function i? d
relocate th^ less unique the facility housing the funct n
is .
Interruptability is a relative measure of how long
the missions can be performed without this specific function
element. How soon after an event is that mission function
required. Arbitrary divisions of seconds, minutes, hours,
days and weeks give the study group indications of the
relative importance of the mission function. The longer the
timeframe for need the more interruption the function can
accommodate and hence the facility type can be lower
Duplication is the extent to which the fun on is
duplicated within the area, on base or off. Duplica .on of
services or functions may not seem very common but they can
occur. Messing services are usually scattered throughout
the base; gallies, clubs, and snack bars all could serve as
messing areas if needed. At an air station, functions
performed by one squadron are usually duplicated by others.
All mission functions that are required need to be examined
for duplicate facilities performing the same function.
Duplication generally requires the same type of equipment at
both sites.
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Figure 3.1 shows the effect of the uniqueness
considerations on the determination of facility types. As a
facility becomes less unique, i.e. relocatable,
interruptable or is duplicated, its category can be lowered.
Facility type 2 is intended to be reserved for those
facilities that must continue where they are with no break
in service. Figure 3.1 is a generalized example, the actual
facility determination must take into account the specific
situation encountered.
With the possible changes in facility types due to
the uniqueness considerations, the definitions for the
different facility type categories as defined above are
generally ignored. During and after the evaluation for
"uniqueness", the facility types, except facility type 1,
become an indicator of the relative importance of the
facility.
The adjustment of the facility types during the
evaluation of facility uniqueness is not so much a lessening
of the importance of the mission function being performed in
the facility, but a realization that the facility is not
unique to the assets of the base.
"Uniqueness" is a relative function and a
determination that will require the most documentation and
justification for the decisions. The review by the base
commander and others in the chain of command should probably
focus on the "uniqueness" items. If a facility is reduced
to type 3 because of the duplication of a facility nearby,
the chain of command reviewer needs to be aware of this when
reviewing the study. The reason is obvious, if the machine
shop at base A says all their work can be done by the
machine shop at base B and the machine shop at base A is
reduced to a type 3 facility the same arguments can be used
to reduce the machine shop at base B. The problem exists at


























Figure 3.1 Uniqueness Considerations.
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the possibility of reducing all similar type facilities
because of duplication. Whenever duplication is assumed,
the intended use of the duplicate facility must be
highlighted in the study package. Duplication needs also to
be considered in the expected post-disaster environment.
Many functions would be temporarily stopped freeing up
equipment for required repair or mission essential
operations. The information on uniqueness and the
information provided in the next section are essential parts
required in the development of the Emergency Facilities Use
Plan. Appendix D outlines the contents of the Emergency
Facilities Use Plan. Using the messing example, a listing
of all possible messing facilities (galleys, clubs, snack
bars) is provided along with the characteristics and
desirabilities of each. The collection and availability of
this information for use in the event of an emergency may
save valuable time in reestablishing the mission performance
of the base.
An integral part of this section and the next are
discussions with the facility user by the study group. The
most important facility user is that department/ tenant who
is causing a facility to be classified type 2 or 3. There
may be one room that is causing a facility to be classified
as type 2. The study group's concern is with the function
being performed in that room. How relocatable is the
function, how much interruption is allowable; to what extent
is that function duplicated. The study group will have
information from the surveys, mission documents, Phase I and
II studies, base master plans, damage estimates, etc. and
can discuss the needs and thoughts of the facility user.
These discussions will answer the questions on facility and
function uniqueness and what subordinate functions are
required to support the specific facility and function.
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Thus far in the study no mention of possible damage
has been made. In discussions with department heads/ tenant
commands expected damage must be looked at in isolation
initially, as in the damage to a specific building. What
will the department head do if his building is damaged?
Then discussions on the impacts of the expected damage to
the base in general as discussions progress. First, in the
discussion a "what if" question in isolation is asked: What
will you do if an earthquake destroys only your function?
If the determination is made that the function is easily
relocatable or duplicated questions need to be asked on how
will the people, materials, etc. get to the new location.
At this point the extent of damages in become generalized.
If the function requires the movement of large trucks, will
the trucks be able to move, given the anticipated damage
along the route? Does the installation have sufficient
trucks to perform the required movements to meet the mission
demands? All aspects of the proposed actions need to be
explored taking into account the anticipated damage.
3 . Determine Subordinate Functions to Mission Essential
Facilities
The survey provides the study group with information
on the important facilities for the performance of a base's
missions and a listing of special requirements to perform
those missions. To more specifically define the special
requirements a follow up survey was developed by NCEL for
all type 2 and 3 facilities. These survey forms are
included in Appendix A. Copies of survey forms 2 and 3 are
sent to the units/departments who are causing a facility to
be classified as facility types 2 and 3 respectivly. These
surveys are intended to gather more information on the
uniqueness of the function and the support functions
required to sustain the function's operation. These surveys
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should be distributed and returned before specific
interviews are conducted.
The study group armed with the results of the
surveys and knowledge of the missions of the base, is now
prepared to totally evaluate the base for the mission
important facilities. Any adjustments to the facility type
listings resulting from the results of the follow-up surveys
need to be made. Next the study group conducts interviews
with the units/departments whose functions are causing a
facility to be classified type 2 or 3 . These interviews are
to examine the mission functions being performed therein,
the utilities required to perform the functions, the
interdependences from other units/departments required to
perform the function, the interruptability , the duplicity or
the relocatability of the function. Face to face
discussions with the department head/unit representative can
lead to innovative thinking and ideas not thought of when
the surveys were filled out. This may cause the facility to
be typed in another category or upgraded or reveal another
facility that is required to ensure the function is
performed. An example: if a function requires a specific
telephone cable to perform its mission, the portions of the
telephone system containing that cable now becomes as
important as the function it is supporting. The building
housing the telephone exchange may now become a type 2 or 3
facility. The discussions with the units/departments can
reveal what their impressions of the support to them are and
what their needs really are. The study group must act as a
devil's advocate to try to lessen the facility type and as
an advisor to the unit /department to upgrade the facility
type. With the knowledge of the overall missions of the
base, the relative importance of the facilities, the study
group is in the unique position to determine the overall
importance of the facility. The discussions with the user
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provides a forum for the expression of the users concerns
and the possibility for some "what if" discussions. The
study group may have information from their investigation of
the base that need to be presented to the user. For
example: if a portion of the base is subject to flooding by
tsunamis the user who has a type 2 or 3 facility in a
possible flooding zone must be made aware of this
possibility. The user's plan for dealing with this
possibility may reveal a new insight as to the importance of
the facility or the increased importance of another
facility. Previously mentioned was the possibility that a
single room may cause an entire facility to be classified as
type 2 or 3 . During the discussions with the users the
possibility of moving this function to another facility
should be discussed and some of the problems associated with
such a move aired.
Evaluating the facility for "uniqueness" and
determining the subordinate facilities are the most
important parts of the survey process. Without these two
steps the mission essential facilities could have been named
by the Commanding Officer (CO). A CO ' s list of mission
essential facilities would be based on the CO ' s knowledge of
the bases missions and the functions performed in the
various buildings. What would most likely be missing from a
list prepared by the CO is the dependence of that mission
essential facility on another facility. If the
communications center is dependent on a telephone cable to
perform the mission, that cable is as important as the
facility housing the communications center. If the
telephone cable passes through switching gear in another
building, that switching gear is as important as the
communications center.
The final rank ordering of facilities by the study
group is based on all the considerations outlined above.
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The reasons why a facility is classified as it is need to be
documented to aid in the review process. Again the reminder
that the purpose of a facility is to house a mission
function. If the function is easily relocated, the
documentation should so state. If the function is
duplicated, the documentation should state where the
duplicate facilities are. This is the information the base
commander and the chain of command reviewers need to have to
approve the facility type listing and the overall plan. The
end result of this section of the study is the listing of
the most important base facilities and information required
for the Emergency Facilities Use Plan.
The Emergency Facility Use Plan is a natural
by-product of this study, each mission function is
identified and facilities that could be used to satisfy the
mission function identified. Recommended format and
contents of the Emergency Facility Use Plan are contained in
Appendix D.
4. Approval of the Mission Essential Facility List
The facility type listings need to be approved by
the base Commanding Officer. The study group should prepare
the facility type listings along with a brief explanation of
the survey process. The study group, most likely, will know
which facilities the Commanding Officer feels are mission
essential and if these facilities are not in types 2 or 3
should highlight the reasons why the facility is typed
lower. This is where the documentation plays an important
role in defending the decisions made by the study group.
However, the study group should be prepared to adjust the
facility type listings based on the Commanding Officer's
decisions. It is at this point where the facilities types 2
and 3 are labeled as "mission essential" and "very
important" respectivly. Facility types 3 and 4 are labeled
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as "important" and "others" The use of word descriptions now
are used to highlight the special importance of these
facilities over other base facilities. With proper
documentation there should be little adjustment by the
commander.
With an approved facilities type listing, as
direction is required for selecting facilities to be
evaluated under the engineering and seismic studies the base
is assured of having the studies performed on the facilities
that are most important to them.
C. RECAPITULATION OF STEPS
1. Distribute the Tactical/Strategic Investigative Survey to
Department Heads/Tenant Commands.
2. Examine the mission statements of the base and tenant
commands
.
3. Gather information on the earthquake potential, expected
damage, etc. Examples include: Phase I and II studies, Base
Master Plans, state or community disaster estimates.
4. Evaluate surveys, determine facilities types listings
from user's estimates.
5. Distribute follow-up questionnaires to the
department/unit who are causing a facility to be type 2 or
3.
6. Evaluate follow-up questionnaires, determine type 2 and 3
facilities based on follow-up questionnaires.
7. Conduct interviews to determine "uniqueness" of the
facilities and subordinate facilities required.
8. Prepare final type 2 and 3 facilit es li ing with
documentation for base commander's approval.
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IV. PRIORITIZING PROJECT UPGRADES
The previous chapter outlined a procedure to classify
the bases facilities into facility types. The question of
how seismically safe those facilities are remains to be
determined. Safety involves the hazards inherent in the
facility structure, the hazards from the machinery and
furnishings (nonstructural hazards) in the facility and the
hazards from nature's effects, flooding, etc.
The evaluation phase contains two sections. The first
concerns the gathering of information concerning the seismic
threat and upgrading projects. The second section is
concerned with evaluating the information to determine a
rank ordering of the upgrading projects.
The output from this section are rank ordered lists of
upgrading projects. These lists are differentiated by the
different facility types. The intended use of the rank
ordered listings is in the development of upgrading project
funding submissions. The rank ordering process provides an
indication as to the seismic upgrading benefit from the
invested cost to upgrade the facility. Within the facility
type determination is a facility importance concern. Based
on the relative mission importance described by the facility
types, facility type 1 projects should be funded before type
2 and so forth. It can be imagined that the projects
developed may far exceed even a liberal estimate of funds
available to correct the seismic hazards problem. In this
light only facility types 1, 2 and possibly 3 should be
evaluated at first. The effort required to determine the
different costs is extensive and could be expensive.
Limiting the evaluation to the first two or three facility
types at the outset is recommended. In the event that there
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are only a few upgrading projects identified, acility types
4 and 5 could then be evaluated.
A. INFORMATION GATHERING
The results of the engineering and seismic studies will
provide much of the information required for the rank
ordering process described in this chapter. However, much
additional information is required and is described below.
Information required for other models presented may be in
excess of that described below. When additional information
is required methods for obtaining the infor ition are
outlined. The types of information that are required
concern the facility replacement cost, upgrading costs,
anticipated damage, etc. The sources of this information
are varied and differ as to the reliability of the
information they provide.
For the information collecting portion a worksheet has
been developed. A copy of this worksheet, entitled the
Individual Facility Worksheet is included in Appendix A.
The various inputs to the Individual Facility Worksheet are
be described below.
1. The Individual Facility Worksheet
a. Facility Number and Facility Type




The "Relocated From/To" line is used as an
indicator. Previously mentioned was the consideration that
a single mission function could cause a facility to be typed
high. The relocation from/to line s used in two ways. The
"relocated to" indicat r is used the mission function
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causing the facility to be typed as it is can be relocated.
On the line the "to" is circled or underlined and the
facility number of the facility proposed for the relocation
of the mission function is indicated. Relocation is useful
if there is one mission function causing an otherwise
unimportant facility to be classified high or if the costs
to seismically upgrade the facility occupied are quite high.
Based on the knowledge and information the study group would
possess at this time, a suitably relocation facility could
be found. Relocation inplies lowering of the facility type.
If a mission function is relocated, the facility is
reevaluated to determine the new facility type. The study
group would have all the necessary information required to
determine the new facility type from the basic survey.
Consideration must also be given to the overall effect of
relocation. If a facility has collectively: a type 1
mission function and four type 2 functions, the benefits of
relocating the type 1 facility may not be worthwhile because
of the type 2 facilities also occupying the facility. The
"relocated from" indicates the mission function is being
considered for relocation to the facility represented by the
worksheet. The "from" is circled or underlined and the
facility number of the mission function being relocated is
placed on the line. For "relocated from" facilities a
worksheet is prepared and the costs associated with
relocating the mission function are prepared and entered.
The elements of relocation costs are outlined below. The
"relocated from" facility worksheet is attached to the
"relocated to" worksheet to highlight the potential facility
type and the relationship to the relocated function, if the
mission function is relocated.
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c. Damage Estimates
The damage estimates are required for the
determination of the costs if an earthquake happens. The
damage estimates are an essential part of the Phase I
studies. The Phase I studies provide damage estimates in
percent damage for three different Peak Ground Acceleration
(PGA) "g" force levels or return times. On the worksheet
damage estimates for the three Phase I study levels or
return times are entered. Level refers to the return time
or PGA "g" level, percent is the percent damage estimated,
and source is the Phase I or other urce
.
The next line on Probable Damage is the
probability of occurrence of the different seismic events
times the percent damage estimates for those events. The
method for calculating the probable damage is presented in
the rank ordering technique section.
d. Replacement Costs
The next section concerns the replacement cost
of the facility. The replacement cost includes both the
structural replacement cost and the cost to replace the
furnishings, contents, or stems serving the facility. The
structural replacement ^jst of specific facilities is
contained in the "Detailed Inventory of Naval Shore
Facilities" NAVFAC P-164 distributed to each Shore Facility
by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. This document
contains the theoretical replacement cost of existing
facilities based on the actual purchase cost and a year cost
correction factor. The structural replacement cost provided
is of good value and is sufficient for use in the evaluation
process
.
The contents and systems replacement costs are
as important, and perhaps more so, than the structural
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replacement costs. What makes a facility important is the
mission function being performed in the facility.
Generally, for a type 2 facility there is a piece of
equipment that is required to perform the mission. The
computers supporting the Communications Center is an
example. The cost to replace the mission required equipment
may be more than the cost to replace the building it is
located in. The structural and contents replacement costs
together form an important base in evaluating the upgrading
projects. The results of the evaluation process without
these contents costs is in effect, worthless.
Unfortunately, there is no one source of
contents replacement costs as there is for the structural
replacement costs. Content items, furnishings or equipment,
originally costing over $1,000 and $3,000 are recorded as
plant property Classes III or IV as appropriate. The plant
property records are maintained by the Authorization
Accounting Activity serving the base. Memorandum records
are usually maintained by the base comptroller. Plant
property class III is equipment, other than Industrial Plant
Equipment, that has a useful life of over two years and a
cost of over $1,000. Class III property does not form an
integral part of a building or another piece of equipment.
Examples include : computers , typewriters, etc. Class IV
property is Industrial Plant Equipment, costing over $3,000.
Class IV is often refered to as equipment that makes
equipment. Machine tools, lathes, etc. are examples of
Industrial Plant Equipment. The Defense Industrial Plant
Equipment Center monitors and manages the Industrial Plant
Equipment. Specific information on Class III and IV Plant
Property definitions, accounting, etc. are contained in
Reference 22.
Generally, the plant property records are not
filed by facility number but are filed by responsible
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de rtment . The translation of the equir -.ent costs to
sp ific facilities, as is necessary for determining
n structural replacement costs, will be a time consuming
j o. Assistance from the departments responsible for the
equipment in determining the location of the equipment will
greatly reduce the work of the study group.
The plant property records reflect the purchase
cost and must be adjusted to reflect the replacement cost.
Replacement costs for much equipment can be found through
the supply department, or the user may be able to provide an
estimate. Replacement costs provided by the supply
department are generally of a higher reliability than
estimates provided by the user. If no estimates of the
replacement cost can be provided, the original purchase cost
as shown on the .ant property records can be used.
Consideration must be given to the level of
detail that goes into the determining the contents
replacement costs. The decision to include all equipment in
a facility or only mission required equipment is an
important consideration. This determination is left up to
the study group as local conditions vary. The effort
involved in separating the mission required equipment from
the other equipment may be as much as the effort nvolved in
including all equipment. Generally, the more lformation
available the better. In either event, the contents
replacement costs must be determined consistently for all
facilities on a base. Different criteria for assigning
contents replacement costs may affect the evaluation
process
.
Contents replacement costs provided by the plant
property records contain only the high cost items. Costs of
equipment costing under $1,000 can be estimated by counting
the number of desks, typewriters, mission required
equipment, etc. and applying their replacement costs.
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Depending on the mission function these costs may not be
trivial so it is important that this step be carried out.
Warehouses and inventories are special cases, an average of
the inventory usually carried is adequate to be used as a
contents replacement cost.
So for a multi-use building there can be
replacement costs from computers, inventories, desks,
machine shops, etc. The total of all these contents or
furnishings or equipment replacement costs is the total
contents replacement cost of that facility. There are
several lines to be used to identify some of the high cost
items if desired.
The total replacement cost (structural and
contents) is determined for each facility and is entered on
the worksheet
.
The Total Damage line is the Total Replacement
Cost times the Probable Damage estimate of the facility.
The method for determining the Probable Damage estimate will
be developed in the section on Rank Ordering Technique.
e. Upgrading Costs
The next cost required for the worksheet is the
upgrading cost. The upgrading costs are comprised of three
types, structural, nonstructural and other upgrading costs.
The Phase II studies provide the structural and
nonstructural upgrading costs. If the Phase II study has
not been performed at the base the listings of facilities by
facility types should be used to direct the Phase II
investigations. Facilities typed as 1, 2 and 3 should be
evaluated under the "Mission Essential Criteria" option of
the Phase II investigation. If the facility was not
evaluated under a Phase II study these costs can be gathered
from other sources. Structural and nonstructural upgrading
costs for facilities not evaluated by a Phase II study can
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be obtained by commissioning a Phase II study through the
Engineering Field Division. The Public Works department or
center may be capable of performing the structural study.
The method chosen will depend on the complexity of the
facility and the funding available to conduct the study.
For type 1 and 2 facilities a Phase II type study should be
performed. For type 3 to 5 facilities a less reliable
estimate can be used. Consistency within each facility type
is again recommended.
Nonstructural upgrading costs can be estimated
by the study group or by Public Works. References 23 and 24
present techniques for evaluating a facility for
nonstructural hazards. Estimates of the cost to reduce
these hazards can be provided by the public works department
or center.
The other upgrading costs are the costs to
reduce the nonfacility related seismic hazards. These can
be the hazards from flooding, tsunamis, earthslides, etc.
Each of these hazards need to be individually examined and
costs to reduce these hazards assigned. If, for example, a
facility is subject to flooding perhaps the best alternative
would be to relocate the function. If an additional
retaining wall would reduce the damage from flooding the
cost to construct the retaining wall would be included in
the total cost to upgrade the facility.
f. Relocation Costs
The relocation costs include the cost of moving
the function, the cost to rehabilitate the new location
(except seismically ) , the cost of the mission function
equipment to be relocated and any costs involved with
discontinuing the function to allow the move. The costs to
seismically upgrade the receipt facility are not considered
in the relocation cost. As the seismic upgrading cost are
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already included in the upgrading cost for the proposed
relocation facility prepared under a Phase II study. As an
example, if a computer operation was to be relocated the
relocation costs would include: The replacement cost of the
equipment, files, desks, etc. required to perform the
mission function being relocated, and the cost associated
with moving this equipment. Also included are the costs to
prepare the receipt facility for the function: increased
electrical circuits, air conditioning, office spaces,
computer flooring, etc. anything that is required to allow
the function to operate. Lastly are the costs associated
with the discontinuance of operations during the actual
moving period. In the example, if time on another computer
system is required to perform the mission tasks or a
specialist is required to recertify the equipment after the
move, these costs should be included as relocation costs.
If in the example, it is decided to purchase a new computer
to put into the new spaces rather than move the old
computer, the inclusion of the cost of a the new computer as
a relocation cost is left up to the determination of the
study group. The replacement costs of the mission function
equipment is necessary to reflect the increased replacement
value of the facility, if the function is relocated.
The information on the completed worksheets are
useful in the development of the base's Seismic Damage
Potential Map. The definition of the Seismic Damage
Potential Map and the procedures for developing one are
described in Appendix E.
When the "Relocated From/To" indicator is used
the process indicates the Individual Facility Worksheet
should be placed with the worksheet of the facility from
which the mission function is being relocated. Additional
replacement and relocation costs are added to the base costs
of the facility rendering the worksheet in error for
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evaluation of the basic facility if the relocation is not
accomplished. Therefore, the use of multiple Individual
Facility Worksheets for a single facility is recommended.
For the evaluation of a possible relocation facility within
its original facility type the replacement and upgrading
costs of the facility without any relocation costs are used.
For the evaluation as a relocation site the base
(replacement and upgrading) costs and the additional
(upgrading) costs are indicated. If the determination is
made to relocate the duplicate worksheet can be removed. If
more than one relocation is suggested for a facility the
individual additional relocation related costs should be on
one worksheet and the combined relocation related costs
should be on another worksheet.
The Phase I studies may not evaluate every
building on a base. Often a single facility is evaluated
and the results are assumed to be the same for all similar
facilities. For example, if a base has seven barracks
buildings built to the same design at the same time, the
results from the Phase I study can be applied to all the
seven buildings. Depending on the circumstances the Phase
II engineering studies may be used in the same manner.
With all the costs gathered and the worksheet
completed the evaluation or rank ordering process can begin.
B. RANK ORDERING MODEL
The technique for rank ordering the upgrading projects
is through the use of a simple model that uses the
information available from the Individual Facility







R = the relative ranking of the facilities upgrading
project
.
Change in Damage = The dollar estimate of the expected
damage to the facility before upgrading less the dollar
estimate of the expected damage to the facility after
upgrading (Damage w/o Upgrading - Damage w/ Upgrading).
Upgrading Costs = The dollar estimate to upgrade the
facility from the Individual Facility Worksheet.
The projects are ranked by the value of R.
The assumptions involved with this model are:
1. It is to be used as a tool to aid decision makers,
and not as an absolute determinant.
2. The level and reliability of the data used is
relatively constant across facility types.
1 . Change in Damage
The numerator, Change in Damage, is the measure of
the seismic hazards reduction the upgrading project would
provide. The expected damage is based on the probability of
occurrence of an earthquake. Inherent to the Phase I study
is a table of the probability of occurrence of Peak Ground
Acceleration (PGA). This table is a product of the Site
Seismicity Study portion of the Phase I study. Table VII is
the table from the NAS , Moffett Field Site Seismicity Study
[Ref. 19]. These tables are determined by automated means
based on the location of the base to known earthquake faults
and other geologic and seismic information.
To utilize the table it must be converted into a
graph of the cumulative and individual probabilities versus
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the PGA. Figure 4.1 is s .ch a graph. The data on the
cumulative probability distribution line is simply the data
from Table VII. The data on the individual probability
distribution line is derived from the information in Table
VII With the graph and the damage estimates provided by the
Phase I study the expected damage can be computed.
TABLE VI
Probabilities of Excee dance of Peak Ground
A<2celeration






















a. Damage Without Upgrade
The expected damage to the facility without any
upgrade (Damage w/o Upgra.e) is determined by computing the
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PEAK GROUND ACCELERATION (G'S)
Figure 4.1 Probability of Exceedance
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evaluate The Phase I study provides a damage estimate for
three Pl.a levels, corresponding to three return times.
Using the probability grapi. and the PGA levels a histogram
of the probability of occurrence of those three PGA levels
is constructed. The probabilities of occurrence of the
various PGA's are divided into three categories. The three
categories are computed as follows: The first category is
the PGA from to the mid-point of the PGA's associated with
the 50 and 100 year return times. The second category is
the PGA's from the mid-point just determined to the
mid-point of the PGA associated with the 100 and 225 year
return times. The final category is from the PGA associated
with the mid-point just determined to 1. The probabilities
associated with the occurrence of peak ground accelerations
within each of the three categories is determined from the
site seismicity study probabilities. The total probability
of damage is found by multiplying the combined percent
damage from the Phase I study for the PGA at the center of
the category times the probability of occurrence of that
category. The Damage w/o Upgrade is the total replacement
cost times the total probability of damage just calculated.
An illustrative example is included.
b. Damage With Uograde
The expected damage with or after upgrading
(Damage w/ Upgrading) is again based on the probabilities of
occurrence of the PGA levels. The upgrading projects
developed by the Phase II study are designed to a PGA level.
This PGA level is determined by the Engineering Field
Division administering the study. For facilities evaluated
as "Mission Essential" by a Phase II study the upgrading
design is to allow the building to remain functional after
the design earth ike. The design earthquake is an
rthquake up to .e PGA specified. For this model the
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assumption is made that the damage up to and including the
design PGA is 0. Damage above the design PGA is the basis
of the Damage w/ Upgrade. Using the graph developed from
the probability of occurrence the cumulative probability of
occurrence above the design PGA is determined. This
probability of occurrence is used as the percent damage for
Damage w/ Upgrade. The use of this probability as the
percent damage implies a 100% damage estimate. The use of
the 100% damage estimate is appropriate for two reasons.
First, an earthquake above the PGA of the upgrading design,
most likely, result in loss of the mission function, even if
the facility is not totally destroyed. For facility types
1, 2 and 3 the study is more concerned with the continuance
of the mission function that the damage to the facility
housing the function. Secondly, the use of 100% damage is
the most conservative estimate. Use of this conservative
estimate will lower the calculated R. As long as the 100%
damage above the design PGA is applied consistently for all
facilities, the effect of this assumption is minimized. The
Damage w/ Upgrade is the percent damage times the new
replacement cost of the facility. The new replacement cost
is the replacement cost from the Individual Facility
Worksheet plus the cost of the upgrading project. The
increase in replacement cost is necessary to reflect the
additional investment in the facility due to the upgrading
project
.
Due to the limitations of the Rapid Analysis
technique used in the Phase I studies, some facilities are
not studied or are represented by other facilities. These
non-studied facilities are usually unique in function or
design. Water towers, large arch hangers and utilities
systems are examples. The percent damage estimates for
these facilities should be determined by an engineering
study. The Phase II study requirement should include an
65
estimate of damage at the three PGA levels used in the Phase
I study. If the Phase II study has been completed an
engineering study should be conducted for all type 1 and 2
facilities, as a minimum, to determine these damage
estimates. The engineering study can be such that it
establishes a damage percent for the three PGA levels or
that it provides a word picture of the damage at each PGA
level. If the word picture option is chosen, Table VI is
then consulted to determine the percent damage from the word




The denominator, C ;st of U grade, is the cost of the
upgrading project developed by the Phase II study.
3 Example Calcul .tions
An illustrative example: Appendix B contains the
Phase I and II reports for Building 144 at NAS , Moffett
Field. Using the information in the Appendix and the
probabilities from Table VII and Figure 4.1 the relative
rank ordering (R) for building 144 will be determined.
a. Damage w/o Upgrade
Probability of Occurance-NAS , Moffetu Field was
evaluated at PGA levels of 0.09, 0.25 and . 34g
corresponding to 50, 100 and 225 year return times. The
categories for the probability histogram are to 0.17, 0.17
to 0.30 and 0.30 to 1. The probabilities for these
categories are 0.2302, 0.4315 and 0.3383 respectively.
Combined Damage Estimate-From the Phase I
evaluation of Building 144 the combined damage estimate is
28.1% for 0.09g PGA, 66.7% for 0.25g and 66.7% for 0.34g.
Replacement Cost-$8 , 198 , 000 ($3,198,000
structural replacement cost and an assumed
contents/nonstructural replacement cost of $5,000,000)
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TABLE VII
Word Picture Damage Estimates
Description————-Structural—Nonstructural—Percent
Damage Damage Damage
No damage none none <0.1
Minor nonstructural damage-a few walls and partitions
cracked, incidental mechanical and electrical damage.
none minor 0.2
Localized nonstructural damage-more extensive cracking
(but still not wide-spread) ; possible damage to
elevators and/or other mechanical/electrical
components.
none localized 0.6
Widespread nonstructural damage-possibly a few beams
and columns cracked, although not noticeable.
not noticeable widespread 2
Minor structural damage-obvious cracking or yielding in
a few structural members; substantial nonstructural
damage with widespread cracking.
minor substantial 5
Moderate structural damage-cracking and yielding in a
number of members; substantial nonstructural damage,
moderate substantial 10
Substantial structural damage requiring repair or
replacement of some structural members; associated
extensive nonstructural damage.
substantial extensive 15
Major structural damage requiring repair or replacement
of many structural members; associated nonstructural
damage requiring repairs to major portions of interior;
building vacated during repairs.
major near total 30
Building condemned.
not repairable total 70
Collapse collapse total >70
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Probable Damag -Probability of PGA times the
Damage at that PGA. 0.2302 X 0.281 0.4315 X 0.667 + 0.3383
X 0.667 = 0.578 or about 58% damage to the facility and
contents without any upgrading.





Probability of Occurance-The Phase II design PGA
for NAS, Moffett Field is 0.34g PGA. From Figure 4.1 the
probability of occurrence above . 34g PGA is about 0.25.
Combined Damage Estimate-assumed to be 100%
Replacement Cost-$10 , 073 , 000 ($8,198,000 total
replacement cost $1,875,000 upgrading project cost)
Probable Damage-25% (0.25 X 1.00)
Damage w/ Upgrade-$2 , 518 , 250 (0.25 X
$10,073,000)
c. Cost to Upgrade
Upgrading Cost-$l, 875 , 000 from the Phase II
study
.
d. Relative Rani' Ordering









for a R = 1.2
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V. ALTERNATIVE RANK ORDERING TECHNIQUES
Two other rank ordering techniques will be examined
here. Their background, strengths and weaknesses will be
discussed. The two methods are: (1) Seismic Risk Mitigation
Model of the Navy Earthquake Risk Reduction Panel; and (2)
the Available Funding model.
A. SEISMIC RISK MITIGATION MODEL
The Navy Earthquake Risk Reduction Panel outlined the
following model in their report on Seismic Hazards at U.S.
Navy Installations. Their model will be explained in terms
of the methodology outlined above. [Ref. 21]
Their model assumes that the facilities being evaluated
by the model are (1) identified as having a relatively high
risk from the Phase I study and (2) of relatively high
importance in achieving the mission of the base. The two
assumptions are met by evaluating the facility types 1
through 3 and by not evaluating facilities with low Phase I
damage estimates. The panel addresses two caveats for their
model. First, the model is intended to be a tool to aid
decision makers, not a substitute for them. Second, the
information required for the model is not necessarily easy
to obtain, but is essential to the model.
In the basic model the value of upgrading a particular
facility depends on four items:
1. The relative importance of the facility for
performing the mission.
2. The probability of earthquakes affecting the
usefulness of the facility.
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3. The damage caused to the facility by an earthquake
if the facility is upgraded.
4. The damage caused to the facility by an earthquake
if the facility is not upgraded.
The relative value of upgrading facility "i", which is
written as v(i), is:




V. = the relative importance (i.e. value of facility "i"
to performing the mission.
P.(m) = the probability of an earthquake of Modified
i
Mercalli magnitude "m" over the expected lifetime of
facility "i"
d (i,m) = the percent damage (meaning percent loss of
usefulness for performing the mission) to facility
"i" caused by a magnitude "m" earthquake if there
is no upgrade of the facility,
d (i,m) = the percent damage to facility "i" caused by a





(i,m) - d-,(i,m)] indicates the percent
reduction in damage to facility "i" caused by an earthquake
of magnitude "m" if the facility is upgraded relative to if
the facility is not upgraded. To use this model, it is




(i,m), d (i,m) for all
relevant facilities "i" and magnitudes "m" at a given base.
The V. represents value judgments on the value of the
facility "i". The methodology for determining the facility
types will lessen the judgemental portion of this term. As
can be seen the greater the value of V . the greater the
relative value of upgrading (v(i)) the facility. To
maintain consistency with the importance of the facility
types previously developed, facility type 1 should have
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V. values in the 90-100 range; facility type 2:80-89; and
facility type 3: 50-79. If facility types 4 and 5 are
evaluated their V- Value should be less than 50. Assigning
separate V • values for each facility within a facility type
is acceptable.
To determine P- (m) requires professional judgements from
individuals knowledgeable about earthquakes and their
affects. P. (m)can be calculated from a Poisson model of
earthquake occurance for the base location. The probability
of a magnitude "m" earthquake per year for each magnitude
"m" could be determined. From the Poisson model and the
remaining lifetime of the facility "i" the calculation of
P. (m) is made. Note P. (0) would be the probability of no
earthquake affecting facility "i" during its lifetime.
The damage estimates dg(i,m) and d^(i,m) would depend on
professional judgments of two types. One type would concern
the impairment of facility "i" when subject to an earthquake
of magnitude "m" under upgraded conditions and if not
upgraded. Estimates for dg(i,m) would be determined by
experts in the field. The information gathered thus far has
not provided the information required to determine d^ (i,m)
and d , ( i , m )
.
After the information necessary is obtained and
processed using the model formula, the result is a set of
numbers v(l), v(2), etc. corresponding to the facilities
evaluated. If v(l) is greater than v(2), then the relative
value of upgrading facility 1 is greater than the relative
value of upgrading facility 2. However this alone does not
mean that it is more effective to upgrade facility 1. To
account for the cost in upgrading the facilities the v(i) is
divided by the cost to upgrade facility "i" [$(i)] to






The larger the effectiveness E. , the more cost effective
it would be to upgrade facility "i". The rank ordering
would be by E .
1
The basic model of the Panel has only been expressed.
Variations to this model include considerations for costs of
fatalities and reconstruction costs and a model that
addresses different levels of upgrading. The models
proposed by the Panel are presented in Appendix C.
The major drawback with the Earthquake Risk Reduction
Panel Model and its variations is the effort required to




(i,m) and d , (i,m) all require information not provided
by the Phase I or II studies.
B. AVAILABLE FUNDING RANK ORDERING
The dollar estimates of the upgrading projects developed
to reduce the seismic hazards will naturally vary. Projects
that simply reduce nonstructural hazards in a newer facility
may be relatively inexpensive. Projects requiring massive
structural changes may be in the multi-million dollar range.
Funding for the upgrading projects follow the requirements
of funding other construction or repair projects. The
different funding level categories are:
For Construction/Alterations:
Up to $25,000 Local Approval
From $25,000 to $200,000 Major Claimant
Greater than $200,000 Military Construction
For Repair:
Up to $75,000 Local Approval
From $75,000 to $3 million Major Claimant
From $3 to 5 million Secretary of the Navy
Over $5 million Military Construction
[Ref. 25]
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Naturally as the cost increases the competition for the
funds becomes tougher. Evaluation of the upgrading projects
developed by the different funding categories is now
considered. The upgrading projects should be divided into
the different funding categories by their estimated cost.
The relative rank ordering developed by one of the methods
previously described, should be retained such that all
facility type 1 projects are listed before type 2 etc.
Those projects within the Commanding Officers approval
authority should be submitted for local funding. Possibly
some of these projects could be accomplished by the Public
Works workforce. The projects in the other funding
categories should be considered for submission in those
categories. The specific methods for these submissions
vary, however, the Phase II study does provide a DD Form
1391 that can be used for project submission where required.
By considering the funding categories a type 2 facility
may be seismically upgraded using local funds before a type
1 facility that requires major claimant funding is upgraded.
The realities of competition for funds are such that
deserving projects may never get funded. If the use of
local funds can reduce some seismic hazards it should be
done. The relocation option can use local funding authority
to relocate a mission function from a facility with high
expected damage to a facility with lower expected damage.
Even without specific seismic upgrading relocation could
improve the chance of the mission function remaining
operational following an earthquake.
The author does not anticipate special funding to
specifically reduce the seismic hazards within the Navy.
The Phase II studies will provide the Navy with an estimate
of their seismic vulnerability however the dollar figure to
reduce the seismic hazard is far beyond what can be expected
or requested of Congress. Certain facilities may be so
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important to the Navy that specific projects for seismic
upgrading will be pursued. Such an example is the extensive
seismic upgrading at the Naval Hospital at Oak Knoll,
Oakland, California. The cost of this project is $29
million and is essentially a project to reduce seismic
hazards [Ref. 26]. Without specific funding for seismic
hazards reduction, seismic upgrading projects will either
compete for funding as specific seismic upgrading projects
or as a portion of the costs associated with other
renovation/upgrading projects.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The threat of damage from earthquakes to Naval
facilities is present. The vulnerability of a base and the
missions performed on that base is the focus of several
engineering and seismic studies. Directing the efforts of
these engineering and seismic studies to best suit the needs
of the base is the focus of this thesis. The concern is not
so much with the survivability of the facility but the
continued operation of the mission being performed in the
facility. A procedure is outlined that evaluates the
missions of the base and determines the facilities that are
required to support those missions. The facilities are
examined for their "uniqueness" to determine if the mission
being performed in the facility can be moved after an
earthquake. Further evaluation of the facilities determines
the facilities that are required to support those "mission
essential" facilities. The process is intended to provide a
listing of the facilities that must be seismically protected
because of the important mission function being performed in
the facility. The facilities listings are used to direct
the efforts of the engineering and seismic studies to
evaluate the facilities that are most important to the
performance of the bases missions.
Several methods are presented to evaluate the results of
the engineering and seismic studies. These methods result
in a rank ordering listing of the seismic upgrading projects
developed by the engineering and seismic studies. The rank
order listing is intended to be used in the bases decision
process to determine which projects should be submitted for
funding.
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Two important by-products of the processes described
would be an Emergency Facilities Use Plan and a Seismic
Damage Potential Map. The Emergency Facilities Use Plan is
derived from the information gathered during the evaluation
of the bases missions and the determination of the
facilities required to support those missions. The
Emergency Facilities Use Plan is a central document that
would outline the capabilities of the bases facilities in
terms of what mission functions can be performed there, and
conversly, what facilities can support certain missions.
Appendix D outlines what constitutes an Emergency Facility
Use Plan. A Seismic Damage Potential Map is another
by-product of the process described in this thesis. Using
the information provided by the engineering and seismic
studies this map can be developed. A Seismic Damage
Potential Map will show the seismic vulnerability of a base.
Appendix E outlines the contents of a Seismic Damage
Potential Map.
Recommendations for further research are:
1. The methodology as described has not been fully evaluated
under a field test. A study using the methodology as
described should be tested at a Naval base and
recommendations on improving the process based on the
findings should be published.
2. Without a full evaluation of the process in a field test
portions of the methodology described could be used where
the engineering and seismic studies have already been
performed. The rank ordering process has application even
if the determination of the "mission essential" facilities
has not been made. Using the process described to evaluate
the results of the engineering and seismic studies should
result in upgrading project submissions that return the most
benefit to the base for the dollars invested.
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3. Portions of the methodology have applications outside the
seismic hazards arena. The section on determining the
mission essential facilities may have applications in
evaluating facilities for priority of repair in a war damage
environment. The application of the process for determining
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR TACTICAL/ STRATEGIC INVESTIGATION
SURVEY
Part 1A: Write the general mission statement of the
unit /department . Additionally include any special
mission requirements not included in the general
mission statement for peacetime, contingency or
disaster recovery missions.
Part IB: From the general and specific mission statements
shown in Part 1A extract those elements that are
of tactical/strategic significance. Include those
elements that have direct significance to the
military mission. Indicate in which
readiness/alert condition the military element is
performed. Do not include mission elements that
are not of strategic or tactical military
significance
.
Part 2: For each strategic/tactical element shown in Part
IB, provide a detailed breakdown of all functions
that must be accomplished to perform the mission
element. Be specific. Include all support
service provided to your unit /department upon
which you are dependent to accomplish the mission
element even if it is not under your control.
Show the element number from Part IB in the space
provided
.
Part 3: For each of the functions or actions listed in
Part 2, show all facilities and utilities required
to accomplish the function. Include all
facilities and utilities even if they are not
under your control. Note the functions shown are
only those required to support strategic/ tactical
mission elements of direct military significance.
Include all special requirements, such as
electrical power, telephones, mechanical air
conditioning for equipment, etc. Show the current
building number or other identification where the
function is performed.
Part 4: List all buildings/ facilities in which your
unit /department occupies space and performs
functions that are of strategic or tactical
military significance. Include all direct support
facilities over which you have control. Do not
include buildings that are not of military
significance. Show the function performed in the
building. Indicate special requirements, such as
backup electrical power. Indicate your opinion of
the facility type as described below. Indicate if
the function can be relocated in an emergency, if
so to where, give a building number or
description. Indicate if a back-up for this
function exists on base, in the local area, on
other federal installations in the area, if so
where. Give an estimate of how long this function
could be done without in an emergency, without
impairing the mission function.
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FACIL ~Y TYPE
1 itical structure containing materials that, if
^leased into the atmosphere, could cause a
catastrophe
.
2 Facilities directly supporting the military
strategic/ tactical missions that must remain
functional after an earthquake without significant
interruption to prevent serious degradation of the
military mission. Examples include: mission
essential and primary communication or
data-handling facilities, facilities involved in
missile control, launch, tracking or other
critical defense capabilities.
3 Facilities directly supporting the military
strategic/ tactical mission that can substain minor
damage resulting in some limited period of
inoperability but are repairable and can be
returned to service. Also included are indirect
support services supporting medical treatment,
food preparation, f irefighting , utilities. Type 3
facilities generally house functions that are not
relocatable and for which backup sources are not
available
.
4 Facilities important to indirect support
facilities that are significant to maintaining
direct support operations. Direct support,
facilities that have backup or are relocatable.
5 Indirect support facilities (shops, repair
facilities, storage facilities) that can tolerate
disruption or can be relocated to other facilities
or easily reconstituted.
For additional information contact:






Organization NAS XY7 ATMD
Contact Mr - Smith
Phone A/V XXX-XXXX
Address £L_Q Rn* *xx
NAS XYZ, CA XXXXX
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED PART I
ORGANIZATION NAS XYZ AIMD
A. GENERAL MISSION STATEMENT
INSTRUCTIONS: Vrito oonor^t mission stjtomont of onit. tnotmdo j*? spoci+f
mission roqoiromonts not t»« iwd*<f in tno j+m+rj/ mission
stjf+m+mi for po*cotimo, oontinjoncn or- dis-sstor rooororm
mt**'***- Performs intermediate aircraft maintenance
in support of station and fleet aircraft and on associated
equipment. Provides prepositioned maintenance support
equipment and organizational maintenance facilities for
tenant activities.
B. TACTICAL/STRATEGIC MISSION ELEMENTS
INSTRUCTIONS: Yrrto Tic ticil/Strjtecrc mission olomonts im d*t*it. ftoUto
to ro*din*ss condition on pficrmo enock in box if porformod
in tto*t condition, ffo not inciad* monstr-atoyic ofomonts of
mission.
TACTIC AL/STRATEGIC MISSION ELEMENT READINESS
CONDITION
NUMBER Dwcnotion 4 3 2
Provide level 2 5 3 Aircraft Component
Repair





FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF TACTICAL/STRATEGIC MISSION-ELEMENTS
Instructions; Provide detailed breakdown ofstratepe mmian eUmrma in Part 13 in terms of specific functions















Reapir Aircraft Anionics WHA '
a
Repair Aircraft Structural/Hydraulic/Wheel AaaembLiea
Repair/Overhaul Aircraft T-56 Power PLanta
Repair/Certify Aviator Life Support Equipment
Repair/Inapect Aircraft Armament Equipment
Maintain/Repair Teat Equipment
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A. GENERAL MISSION STATEMENT
INSTRUCTIONS: Vritm mmm*r*f missimm st*t*m*emt of amit. f**fad+ j*<f rp+et*/
missimm r*«mir*m*mts mmt im«Imd<ed im thm /<•*«•/-.*/ mirsimm
rtjt+m+mt f»r p+^e+tim+, ammtimmmmmm or disaster /vmmrmry
mixsimms.
B. TACTICAL/STRATEGIC MISSION ELEMENTS
INSTRUCTIONS: Yrrt* T*mtim*lSStr*tmmfm missimm *l*m*mts im 4mt*it. ft*f*t*
fm r*-n*im*?s emmditiom mm mfaeimf emmeic im Amat if mmrfmrmtmm*


















FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF TACTICAL/STRATEGIC MISSION ELEMENTS
Instructions: Provide detailed breakdown of strategic mission elements in Part IB in terms of specific functions
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Mission Essential Structure providing DIRECT support to military mission
and MUST FUNCTION after an earthquake to meet mission requirements.
BUILDING NAS MOFFETT FIELD
OCCUPANT ORGANIZATION
A) Mission Essential Task Being Performed In Building ?









Shock Isolation of Equipment.
Security.
Other , Explain.
D) Does backup exist for any items in C above 2.
E) Can this task be performed at another location on base? Describe.
F) If this building becomes inoperable from an earthquake , how will this task
be accomplished? Can it be performed at another base? Do contingency plans exist?
94
CLASSIFICATION.
Building of high importance which shoulu . >:iven attention to minimize
damage. Mission related facilities providing DIRECT rrapport to military
mission but are not required to be functional immediately after anearthquai
BUILDING NAS MOFPETT FIELD
OCCUPANT ORGANIZATION
A) Mission Related Task Being Performed In Building









Ihock Isolation of Equipment.
Security.
Other , Explain.
D) Does backup exist for any items in C above.
E) Can this task be performed at another location on base Describe.
F) If this building becomes inoperable from an earthquake , how will this task
























Other Upgrading Costs (Item/Cost)
TOTAL UPGRADING COSTS
Relocation Costs




What Function is to be Relocated/From what Facility
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APPENDIX B
PHASE I AND II FACILITY REPORTS
Phase I Facility Report 98
Phase II Facility Report 102
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Year Built - 1952
Length - 802 ft
Height - 24 ft
Area - 160,000 sq ft
Width - 202 ft




















Horizontal - Metal deck, steel X-bracing
Vertical - Steel X-bracing, concrete shear walls
Building Weight - 4,930 k Volume - 3,700,000 cf
Unit Weight - 1.33 pcf
Ductility Factors
Longitudinal - 4.5 Transverse - 3.7
Original Base Shear Coefficient - 0.10 g
Comments:
Building consists of 4 bays separated by 3 concrete fire walls.
The end walls have no lateral strength, thus for lateral forces,
the end diaphragms cantilever off the first interior fire wall.


















PERIOD, SEC. .04 .07 .73 1.22
DAMPING, % .05 .10 .02 .05
STRUCT. CAPACITY, G. 1.29 1.64 .13 .21
BUILDING REPLACEMENT COST: $ 3198000.
DAMAGE ESTIMATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH CEL TM 51-78-02:
—TRANSVERSE DIRECTION— —LONGITUDINAL DIRECTION— —TOTAL—
PK GRND SA SITE DEMAND SA SITE DEMAND COMBINED DAMAGE
ACCEL. YIELD ULT. DAMAGE YIELD ULT. DAMAGE DAMAGE ESTIMATE
G. G. G. % G. G. % % 1000 S
,09-A .09 .11 0.0 .20 .12 42.1 28.
1
898
.25-8 .26 .30 0.0 .55 .32 100.0 66.7 2132
it ** * ************************* * *********************************** * *! */!************
*
.34 .36 .41 0.0 .75 .44 100.0 66.7 2132 *
.40-B .42 .48 0.0 .88 .52 100.0 66.7 2132
A - SIMILAR TO U.B.C. CODE LEVEL FORCE
B - SENSITIVITY CHECK
*.34* = ACTUAL PGA SPECIFIED IN SCOPE, 805 PROBABILITY OF NOT BEING
***** EXCEEDED IN 50 YEARS.
C-58
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EARTHQUAKE SAFETY INVESTIGATION SUMMARY OF
NAVAL INSTALLATIONS
1. ID 1
2. Installation 2 Naval Air Station - Moffett Field
3. Building Number 3 144
4. Use 4 warehouse




6. Type of Construction 6 Steel
7. Number of Stories 7 1
Dimensions:
8. Typical Story Height... 8 24 ft Exception 9 ft
9. Total Height 10
_____________
10. Length 11 802 ft Width 12 202 ft
11. Area 13 160,000 ~sq ft
12. Volume 14 3,700,000 cf
1
Unit wt. 15 1.33 pcf
13. Construction:
Roof 16 Metal deck on steel trusses
Exterior Walls 17 Asbestos siding
Interior Walls 18 Concrete
Columns 19 Steel
Floors 20 Slap on grade
Foundati ons 21 Shallow spread footings
19. Lateral Force Resisting System:
Horizontal 22 Metal deck, steel x bracing
Vertical 23 Steel x bracing, concrete snear walls
20. ATC-3 Classification:
Structural System 24 Building frame
Vert. Seis. Resist Sys 25 Braced frame and shear walls - concrete
21. Orig. Design Base Shear Coef: 26 0.10
22. Base Shear Capacity: C.*-,
Yield Long 27
_13 Trans 28 1_29
_
Ultimate Long 29 .21 q Trans 30 1.54 g
23. Natural Period (seconds):
Yield Long 31 .73 sec Trans 32 _04 sec
Ultimate Long 33 1.22 sec Trans 34 .07 sec
24. Damping:
Yield Long 35 2^
_
% Trans 36 5 %
Ultimate Long 37 5_ , p T Trans 38 10 T
25. Ductility Factor: Long 39 4_5 Trans 40 3_7
26. Max. Ground Accel, at Site:... 41 0.34
27. Base Shear Demand:
Yield Long 42
_75 Trans 43 _36
Ultimate Long 44 _44 Trans 45 .41 g
28. Damage Estimate:
Long 46 100 * Trans 47 0_0
Combi ned 48 66.7 %
29. Replacement Cost, Thousands: ..49 S3, 198 Date 50 June, 1982
Damage Estimate, Thousands: ...51 S2,132
30. Rapid Evaluation Study by: 52 RUTHERFORD & CHEKENE
31. Detailed Struct. Analysis by: 53 RUTHERFORD & CHEKENE
32. Comments: 54 Location of "esistino elements creates torsion,
carnage is oj______ -inae'-esf^atec.
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BUILDING 144
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF BUILDING 144
This report describes the detailed seismic evaluation of structural and nonstructural
elements, and describes a method of structural strengthening, for Building 1** at
N.A.S. Moffett Field. Building 144, a Warehouse, consists of four adjacent structures
separated from each other by concrete fire walls. The four structures are identical
and consist of a steel framed roof on long span steel trusses. The trusses are
supported by steel columns on spread footings. The structures were analyzed
individually using the techniques given in the Evaluation Criteria in Section 1, Part 3
of this report.
The analysis of the structure indicates that the roof diaphragm and longitudinal steel
K bracing are overstressed by Level 1 forces. The repair scheme proposed is to
strengthen the roof diaphragm by adding a new horizontal truss at the bottom chord
of the existing roof trusses, and by adding new K braces. The cost for the structural
repair is approximately $1,300,000.
The nonstructural survey located many potential hazards. These include falling
hazards from light fixtures and overturning hazards from the substantial number of
storage racks. The cost for bracing these elements is approximately $110,000. Thus




DETAILED EVALUATION OF BUILDING 1*4
Description of Building
Building 144/Warehouse is located between McCord Avenue and Took Road, just north
of Walcott Road (see Figure 144-1), and was built in 1952. The building is one-story
throughout, and has a floor area of 160,000 square feet. Refer to the photographs in
Figure 144-2 and the sketch plan and isometric in Figures 144-3 and 144-4.
The roof of Building 144 is a metal deck on steel trusses; the columns are steel; the
exterior walls are asbestos siding on steel channel girts; the floor is a concrete slab-
on-grade; the foundations are shallow spread footings. The interior partitions are
concrete walls. The lateral load resisting system consists of a metal deck diaphragm
and K braced columns in the longitudinal direction, and concrete shear walls in the
transverse direction. The building is laid out as four bays separated by three
concrete fire walls. The end walls have no lateral load resisting system. Therefore,
for lateral forces, the end diaphragms must cantilever off the first interior fire wall. -
Drawings of Building 144 are available at the Naval Air Station Moffett Field.
The Navy has designated Mission Essential as the criteria for analyzing the
earthquake vulnerability of Building 144.
Results of Rapid Analysis
The Rapid Analysis calculations for Building 144 predicted 0% damage in the
transverse direction and 100% damage in the longitudinal direction for the peak
ground acceleration specified for the site.
The combined damage prediction was 66.7%, with an estimated damage cost of
$2,132,000. The damage predictions were judged to be underestimated because the
Rapid Analysis method did not account for the significant torsion which can be
generated by the cantilevered diaphragm system of the end bays under lateral forces.
Results of Detailed Evaluation
Building 144 was evaluated using the Basic Criteria described in Section I, Part 3 of
this report. The fundamental period of vibration was calculated by hand analysis.
See Figure 144-9 for a summary of the results.
Many elements are overstressed by Level 1 forces. The roof diaphragm is
overstressed in shear, also, the connection of the diaphragm to the concrete shear
wails is inadequate at Level I. The braces in the longitudinal direction are also
overstressed by Level 1 forces. At the end bays, the chord members are not
properly anchored.





The repair scheme for Building 144 is to replace the roof diaphragm with new
horizontal trusses below the bottom chord of the existing trusses spanning to new K
braces in the exterior longitudinal wails. For transverse forces, the truss spans to
either the existing concrete fire walls or new K braces in the end walls of the
building. The new K braces require a substantial base connection to tie them to the
exterior concrete foundation wails. Refer to Figures 1*4-5 through 144-8 for the
extent of the repairs.
Alternate methods for repairing the roof diaphragm are possible if the specifics of
the diaphragm construction and connection are known. The existing metal deck roof
diaDhragm could be used if the interconnection of the sheets is adequate, and if
sufficient chords and collectors are provided. The drawings provide no information
concerning this. Thus any alternative scheme is dependent on additional information
available only by reviewing the existing construction and removing a section of roof.
A second alternative would be to strengthen the members and connections of the
horizontal bracing at the top chord of the truss. This would require adding members
and connections in a very congested space. Thus, the repair scheme of new trusses
at the lower chord was chosen for this analysis, because it is most practical for
installation based on the currently available information.
The repaired structure was checked for Level 1 and Level 2 forces using the Basic
Criteria described in Section 1, Part 3 of this report. See Figure 144-9 for a
summary of the results of the analysis of the repaired structure. Care was taken so
that the period of the new horizontal truss would be sufficiently different from the
period of the new K braces to prevent resonance problems. The new compression
members of the trusses and K braces were sized to prevent buckling under Level 2
forces. The existing roof framing is rigidly attached to the fire wall at one end,
referred to here as the fixed end. At the other end, the free end, expansion is
allowed for by providing longitudinally slotted holes in the truss base plate. Similar
allowance for expansion should be provided in the new repairs. The new transverse
truss should be added on the fixed side of the fire wall. At the free side, the
connection of the longitudinal truss should allow expansion.
Results of Nonstructural Survey
The nonstructural element seismic protection field survey showed several potential
hazards to life safety and to essential Navy functions in Building 1*4. These hazards
include falling objects such as light fixtures, overturning elements such as storage
shelves, and the danger of natural gas leaks or disruption of fire extinguisher system
lines.
The field survey methodology includes a hazard rating from -9 to -<-8 for every
element based on occupancy, element failure mode, suDport effectiveness, and
essential function. A hazard rating of zero or less is intended to be acceptable. A
hazard rating above zero is intended to designate elements which present a risk to
life safety or to the Navy mission, or both.
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BUILDING 144
The nonstructural field survey data for Building 1** is included in Volume 2 of the
Detailed Analysis Report. The survey methodology is described in a separate report
titled "Seismic Investigation of Nonstructural Elements, Survey Methodology."
Estimated Repair Costs
The cost for implementing the structural strengthening scheme delineated in this
report for Building 144 is approximately $1,300,000. The cost for retrofitting all
potential nonstructural hazards is approximately $110,000. Thus the total cost for the
repair of the structural and nonstructural hazards is approximately $1,410,000. This
total cost is based on 1984 prices and does not include any factor for future
escalation of prices.
The structural strengthening cost estimate for Building 144 is derived mostly from the
anticipated cost of construction of a new horizontal diaphragm, which consists of five
structural steel trusses. The estimated cost of 20 new K braces is also included.
As might be expected in a warehouse, nearly half of the nonstructural cost is
estimated for bracing existing shelves and storage racks. The total nonstructural
costs estimate will decrease from $110,000 if a higher level of risk is considered
acceptable. For example, retrofitting only those elements with a hazard rating
greater than 4 in either life safety or essential function, would eliminate about
$10,000 from the estimate above. Retrofitting only life safety hazards rated above 4
would cost an estimated $60,000.
Since finishes were not removed during the walk-through evaluation, certain portions
of the utility lines, such as the entrance to the building, could not be reviewed. The
cost for any repairs required in the concealed spaces is not included in the above
estimate. Thus the cost for a more detailed investigation and the repairs resulting
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APPENDIX C
NAVY EARTHQUAKE ADVISORY GROUP MODELS
The following models and descriptions are reproduced
directly from Reference 21.
A. SEISMIC RISK MITIGATION MODEL
This section outlines the elements necessary to examine
the relative effectiveness of improving different naval
facilities on a given base to reduce the consequences of
seismic risks. We would expect this model to be used only
for facilities identified as (1) having relatively high risk
from the Phase I information and (2) being relatively
important in achieving the naval mission.
The discussion below developes the basic model which
accounts for the possible loss of ability to perform the
naval mission as a single objective. The use of such a
model with hypothetical inputs is illustrated in section B.
The model is extended to include objectives concerning
possible fatalities and reconstruction costs in Section C.
(All models discussed through Section C concern only one
possible level of upgrade for each facility in order to
focus on the concepts.) Section D indicates the how one
would extend this to include an examination of different
levels of upgrading for specific facilities and the
decisions of which upgrade is most appropriate for a
specific facility.
Before proceeding, several caveats seem appropriate.
First, the model referred to here should only be a tool to
aid decision makers, not a substitute for them. Second, the
information required is not necessarily easy to obtain, but
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it appears to be essential to the problem. The level of
complexity in the model is necessary to formalize the
components of the problem that common sense tells us are
important
.
In the basic model the value of upgrading a particular
facility (e.g., building, runway) should depend on four
items
:
1. The relative importance of the facility for
performing the naval mission,
2. The probability of earthquakes affecting the
usefulness of the facility,
3. The damage caused to the facility by an earthquake if
the facility is upgraded, and
4. The damage caused to the facility by an earthquake if
the facility is not upgraded.
To be more precise, the relative value of upgrading
depends on the difference in damage to the facility caused
by earthquakes of different magnitudes if it is or is not
upgraded.
Let us assume that we wish to determine the relative
importance of upgrading different facilities for the purpose
of better performance of the naval mission. Then, the
following model will address the items above with a level of
sophistication appropriate for the quantity of data we could
be expected to obtain. The relative value of upgrading
facility "i", which will be written v(i), will be
v(i) = V.Z.P
i
(m)[d (i,m) - d
1
(i,m)] , all i, (1)
where m
V. = the relative importance (i.e. value) of
facility i to performing the naval mission,
P. (m) = the probability of an earthquake of Modified




(i,m) = the percent damage (meaning percent loss of
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usefulness for performing the naval mission) to
facility i caused by a magnitude m earthquake
if there is no upgrade of the facility, and
d (i,m) = the percent damage to facility i caused by a
magnitude m earthquake if the facility is
upgraded
.
Note that the term [d Q (i,m - d-, (i,m)] indicates the
percent reduction in damage to facility i caused by an
earthquake of magnitude m if the facility is upgraded
relative to when it is not upgraded. To use (1), it is
necessary to determine V., P.(m), d
n
(i,m), and d (i,m) for
all relevant facilities i and magnitudes m at a given base.
Some suggestions for this follow.
The V- represent value judgements that would properly
rest with the base commander. He or she may wish to
delegate the authority for purposes of the model. To assess
the V. , ask first for a ranking of the relative significance
of all of the facilities for performing the naval mission.
There may be many facilities with equal significance. Then
arbitrarily assign V.=10 to the least significant facility.
Then for facilities slightly higher in the ranking,
determine by questioning how many times more significant
they are than the least significant facility. If a facility
is twice as significant, assign V. =20 to it. Continue in
this fashion comparing non-rated facilities to previously
rated ones.
To determine P. (m) requires professional judgements from
individuals knowledgeable about earthquakes and their
effects. If all the ground at a base was exposed to the
same seismic risks, then P- (m) would involve the same base
rate for all facilities per unit time. One may, for
example, assume a Poisson model for earthquake occurance,
and calculate the probability of a magnitude m event per
year for each magnitude. From this and the expected
remaining lifetime of the facility, one could calculate
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P.(m). Note that P. (0) would be the probability of no
earthquake affecting the facility i during its lifetime.
The damage estimates d Q (i,m) and d.(i,m) would depend on
professional judgements of two types. One type would
concern the impairment of facility i when subjected to a
magnitude m under conditions of upgrade and no upgrade. The
other type would concern the ability to perform the naval
mission with such impairment. The estimates would
necessarily be generated from discussions with the
individuals having such expertise. In making these damage
estimates, the amount of time the facility would be in a
damaged state before significant repair returns the facility
to operating condition might be accounted for by adjusting
upward the damage estimate.
After the information necessary is obtained and
processed using (1), the result is a set of numbers v(l),
v(2), and so on. If v(l) is greater than v(2), then the
relative value of upgrading facility 1 is greater than the
relative value of upgrading facility 2. But this alone does
not mean that it is more effective to upgrade facility 1.
The difference is that it may be far more expensive to
upgrade facility 1 than facility 2. We can calculate the




where $(i) is the cost of upgrading facility i. The larger
the effectiveness E. , the more cost-effective it would be to
i
upgrade facility i. Given a specific budget for upgrading
facilities, one should upgrade facilities with the highest
E. and continue until the funds are allocated.
i
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B. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE BASIC MODEL
This section illustrates how one would use the basic
model outlines above. The example uses a set of fictious
numbers that are, however, internally consistent.
Suppose we have four facilities: l=runway, 2=fuel
depot, 3=support facilities, 4=mess hall. The relative
values are assumed to be V = 200, V = 60, V
3
= 30, V^ =
10. The expected remaining lifetimes of the facilities are
20, 5, 10 and 10 respectively.
All the facilities are subject to identical seismic
risks. No magnitudes under 4 will cause any damage and the
probabilities of earthquakes of magnitudes 5, 6 and 7
occuring in a five-year period are estimated to be 0.10,
0.006, and 0.02 respectively. An earthquake of magnitude 8
or greater is extremely unlikely. Using the Poisson model,
we would obtain the P.(m) shown in Table VIII (Note: these
i
figures are hypothetical but are fairly consistent with the






1 2 3 4
5 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.19
Intensity 6 0.20 0.06 0.11 0.11
7 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04
119
Next, we need to determine the damage estimates
recognizing that this refers to the degree to which the
naval mission is impared. The required information might be
illustrated as shown in Table IX This indicates, for
insistance, that the percent damage to the runway (facility





(i,m) and cL (i,m)
Facility12 3 4




6 20 30 10 20 20 10
7 60 80 20 30 20 50 30
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The next step is to substitute information in Tables
VIII and IX into (1) and calculate the v(i). For instance
v(l)= 200[0. 36(10-10) + 0.2(30-20) + 0.07(80-60)] = 680 (3)
Similar calculations yield
v(2) = 78, v(3) = 102, and v(4) = 33. (4)
Note that v(l) is large both because the relative value of
the runway (V, =200) is greatest and because its lifetime is
greatest (i.e, 20 years) so the probably that it will be
subject to earthquakes is larger. The changes in the
percent impairment due to earthquakes if an upgrade is
undertaken is greater that the facility 1 for both
facilities 3 and 4.
Suppose the costs of upgrading the facilities are
respectively $ =1.0, $ =0.4, $=0.2, $4 =0.1 in millions of
dollars. Then using (2), (3), and (4), we find the relative
effectiveness of the respective upgrades are
E, = 680/1.0 = 680,
E
2
= 78/0.4 = 195,
E
3
= 102/0.2 = 510,
E
4
= 33/0.1 = 333. (5)
Thus, available funds should first be spent on facility
1, then facilities 3, 4, and 2 in that order.
C. EXTENDED MODEL INCLUDING FATALITIES AND RECONSTRUCTION
COSTS
Possible fatalities and reconstruction costs are
considerations that can be accounted for with expressions
similar to (1). Specifically, the expected number f(i) of
fatalities saved by an upgrade to facility i is
f(i) = I P.(m)[f (i,m) - f^i.m)], (6)
where f (i,m) is the expected number of fatalities at
facility i induced by an earthquake of magnitude m if the
facility is not upgraded and f (i,m) is the expected number
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of fatalities when it is upgraded. Similarly, the expected
cost c(i) saved by an upgrade to facility i is:
c(i) = ^P
i
(m)[c (i,m) - c^i.m)], (7)
where c (i,m) and c.(i,m) are, respectively, the expected
reconstruction costs due to a magnitude m earthquake when
facility i is not and is upgraded.
To determine the relative importance I(i) of upgrading
facility i including impact on naval mission performance,
possible fatalities, and reconstruction costs, we calculate





where k r and k are scaling constants based on valuee
judgements of the commanding officer. They indicate the
importance of fatalities and reconstruction costs relative
to mission performance.
Then similar to (2), the overall effectiveness E'. of




Funds should be invested in projects to maximize
effectiveness when all three objectives are relevant.
D. EXTENDED MODEL ADDRESSING DIFFERENT LEVELS OF UPGRADING
It is straightforward to compare more than one possible
level of upgrade for a particular facility using the
methodology outlined above. First, equation (1) must be
used to calculate the value of upgrading facility i to the
new level. The only term in the equation that may change is
d, (i,m), the percent damage to facility i caused by an
intensity m earthquake if the facility is upgraded. The
percent damage d
n
(i,m) given no upgrade, the probability
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P.(m) of an earthquake of an intensity m over the life of
the facility, and the relative importance V. of the facility
remain the same. Second, the dollar cost $(i) of upgrade
must be changed in equation (2). Finally, to include
possible fatalities and reconstruction costs, the terms
f,(i,m) and c,(i,m) in equations (6) and (7) must be changed
to include the expected number of fatalities and
reconstruction costs with the new level of proposed upgrade.
To avoid ambiguity over notation, let us speak of
upgrade level j to facility i. Then, corresponding to
equation (1) the relative value of upgrade j to facility i,
which will be written v.(i) will be
v.(i) = V
iEP i(m)[d (i,m) - d.(i,m)] (10)
where d.(i,m) is the percent damage to facility i caused by
a magnitude m earthquake if the facility is upgraded to
level j. Then, corresponding to equation (2), the relative
effectiveness E
.
of upgrade level j to facility i is
v.Ci)
J
E. . = (11)
i]
$. (i)
where $.(i) is the cost of upgrade level j to facility i.
Analogous to equation (6), the expected number f (i) of
fatalities saved by upgrade j to facility i is
f (i) =EP i (m)[f (i,m)-f 1(i,m)] J (12)
where f .(i,m) is the expected number of fatalities at
facility i with upgrade j when an earthquake of magnitude m
occurs. Similarly, the expected cost c.(i) saved by upgrade
j to facility i is
c.(i) =£P.(m)[c (i,m) - c.(i,m)], (13)
where c.(i,m) is the expected reconstruction costs due to a
magnitude m earthquake when facility i receives upgrade j
.
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Taking equation (11) through (13) into account as in
equation (8), the relative importance I.(i) of upgrade j to
facility i including impact on naval mission, possible
fatalities and reconstruction costs, we calculate





Finally, analogous to equation (9), the overall
effectiveness of E of upgrade j at facility i is
I. (i)
]
E f .. = (15)ij
3
The expressions (11) and (15) can be used to compare
different possible upgrades to a facility. In general, the
higher the effectiveness, the more desirable the proposed
upgrade. But this information does not tell all the story.
It does not realistically compare the alternative of not to
upgrade with different upgrade alternatives.
(Mathematically, both the value and cost of no upgrade are
zero so equation (11) would be meaningless since it would
divide zero by zero in that case.) It also does not
explicitly focus on the budget available for upgrading
facilities, it rather suggests the most effective upgrades
given a budget. In both of these situations, the decision
makers would want to consider, at a minimum, the
effectiveness and cost of each proposed upgrade level
(including no upgrade) for each facility. A useful way to
present this information might be in a matrix which
specified the various facilities considered on the x-axis
and the different levels of upgrade on the y-axis. In each
cell one would present the relative importance of that
upgrade I- (i), and the cost of the upgrade $ • (i). To
complement each cell, a narrative description of the
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consequences to facility i given upgrade j under various
earthquake intensities might be described. The decision on
what to do with each facility should be taken using
professional judgement and values to combine the relative
importance and cost of each upgrade level, including the
option of no upgrading, as well as the budget available.
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APPENDIX D
EMERGENCY FACILITIES USE PLAN
The Emergency Facilities Use Plan is a by-product of the
determination of the mission essential facilities process.
During the investigation of the bases missions, possibly for
the first time, the department heads/ tenant commands were
able to study their functions and possible options available
to them after an earthquake. The identification of
substitute facilities should not be lost or buried in a
report, but should be promulgated. The collection of this
information in a single source could be of great benefit to
aid in disaster recovery. This section will highlight
recommended items for inclusion in an Emergency Facilities
Use Plan. The plan should be divided into three sections;
the first concerning facilities, the second concerning
functions, and the final on other concerns.
The portion of the plan concerning facilities should be
a listing of the bases facilities with a description of its
characteristics. As a minimum, the descriptions should
include a section on the construction and size of the
facility, simply for general information, along with the
current use of the facility. facility and the major
functional capabilities present in the facility. The major
functional capabilities are akin to the missions being
performed in the facility. Tied to these capabilities are
the major equipment items present in the facility. The
sizes or capabilities of the major equipment items should be
noted. The plan is intended to be used in an emergency,
having the capabilities of a piece of equipment in a
facility handy can save valuable recovery time trying to
determine these items. Identification of the utilities
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servicing the facility is also required. This is included
to prevent possible overloading of the electrical service if
equipment is relocated, etc. Finally, the possible
alternative uses of the facility are addressed. Logical
alternative uses keying on the basic needs and missions of
the base should only be addressed. If a facility has a
snack bar an alternative use could be as a galley. Tied to
the capabilities of the major equipment items, an estimate
of the feeding capacity of that facility can be easily
obtained in an emergency. Facilities identified as being
duplicate facilities or relocation sites for mission
functions from the survey process should be identified as
such in the plan. Examples of the facility characteristics
are described in Table X.
The second section is on the functions. This section is
simply a reorganization of the data to indicate where each
function is and can be carried out. The functions should
key on the basic needs of man and mission functions of the
base. For each identified function the location where it is
currently being carried out along with the capabilities of
that facility are identified. Possible alternative sites
are also identified but are clearly identified as requiring
the relocation of some equipment or supplies to perform the
function.
The final section is on other concerns. Included can be
a plan for allocating transportation, based on possible
requirements identified during the survey process. A
mission function recovery priority based on the final
facility type listing. Primary relocation sites for mission
functions identifying the specific equipment, utilities or
other needs required to relocate and resume the operation of
the mission function. Descriptions of the process for
relocation, prioritizeation of work, responsibilities, etc.








Current Uses -office, hanger, gymnasium, etc.
Major Functional Capabilities -galley, snack bar,
machine shop, message center, radio communications,
secure telephone system, dispensary, cold storage,
berthing, etc.
Major Equipment Items (Capabilities/Sizes ) -cubic feet
of cold storage; feeding capability of galley or snack
bar, number or ranges, scuppers, etc.; equipment in
machine shop, metal or wood lathes, hoists, drill
presses, etc.; berthing capacity of berthing spaces,
normal and under emergency conditions, number of
mattresses, sheets, etc., washing machines, dryers;
fasoline pumps and storage at gas stations;
ypewriters in office spaces, etc.
Utilities -electrical service, telephone service,
water, sewage, dedicated telephone or communications
lines , et c
.
Alternative Uses of the Facility -gymnasium as
berthing , firsTE aid station, warehouse : snack bar as
galley; commissary refrigerators as cold storage; auto
nobby shop as an automobile and truck repair facility;
etc
.
the survey process. The Emergency Facility Use Plan is
intended to be a document that can be consulted to allow a
rapid recovery of mission functions. It is better to know
that the feeding capacity of the clubs is sufficient to feed
the base population in advance than to wonder when the
galley is lost. Concentrating on the needs of man, the
bases mission functions and issues raised during the survey





SEISMIC DAMAGE POTENTIAL MAP
The Seismic Damage Potential Map concept was proposed by
the Navy Earthquake Risk Reduction Panel as a tool to
highlight the seismic hazard potential at a particular base.
The map uses information from the Phase I and II studies
along with on-site engineering estimates, and a compilation
of geotechnical information to highlight the facilities most
subject to seismic damage. The basis of the map is the
color coding of a standard "Base Development Map" to
indicate the different facility types, building performance
characteristics, and nonfacility seismic hazards. Through
the use of overlays many different issues can be addressed.
[Ref. 21]
A Seismic Damage Potential Map is developed as follows.
First the basic Base Development Map is color coded by
facility types. Each facility type is assigned a unique
color and each facility in each facility type is color
coded. For facility types 1 through 3 the individual
facility or system should be identified, i.e. Building 144
or the telephone system. Where possible the most important
mission functions should be identified.
Next, an overlay is prepared indicating the anticipated
damage. The damage estimates from the Individual Facility
Worksheet or Phase I study are to be used. The Panel
recommended using the damage estimate related to "likely
strong ground shaking" at the site, corresponding to
approximatly Modified Mercalli Intensity VIII-IX or, for
seismic zones 3 and 4, to about 0.3 to 0.5g. [Ref. 21].
The damage estimates are stated as the percent damage from
the Individual Facility Worksheets are placed on the overlay
corresponding to the base facilities.
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Next any nonfacility seismic hazards are placed onto an
overlay. Nonfacility hazards include areas subject to
flooding, tsunami damage, soil liquefaction possible areas,
landslide potential areas, etc. The nonfacility hazards use
geologic data. Other overlays can illustrate active or
known earth faults if they traverse the base. Fire sources
and areas of fire spread can be identified on another
overhead. If desired the building construction can be
identified in basic terms and identified on an overhead.
Such basic terms as; wood, steel, reinforced concrete, etc.
are all that is required.
The purpose of the Seismic Damage Potential Map is to
identify the important structures and the possibility of
damage from seismic sources and consequences. Using these
maps with their data presentation, a commander can begin to
see critical and mission essential facilities which may be
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